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IN	 SERVICE:	 10-8	 
GOES	 GLOBAL
“In Service: 10-8” is now in its 14th year of 
publication. It started in 2001 and has 
become a popular read among  Canada’s law 
enforcement community, with readers in all 
of Canada’s provinces and territories. Many of 
our email subscribers share the newsletter 
with others in their organizations. We are also 
proud to say that it is read in locations that 
extend beyond Canada’s borders. If you 
would like to be a regular subscriber to this 
newsletter sign up at:
www.10-8.ca
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Upcoming Events
Human	 Source	 Management
This course will equip participants with the basic skills 
required and the best practices to follow associated to 
the recruitment and handling of informants and agents. 
It includes preparation of judicial authorizations 
utilizing informant/agent information, as well as policy 
and how to effectively report on information delivered 
from these assets. 
June	 23-26,	 2014	 (Victoria)
September	 16-19,	 2014
JIBC	 Police	 Academy	 Advanced	 Training
www.jibc.ca/course/POLADV715 
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
see 
page  
36
 Search
Search warrants are powerful tools that can make or break a case. Recent
court decisions continue to make apparent the importance of clear, accurate
and complete Search Warrant Applications and the consequences of deficient
drafting.
Whether you’re a Crown Attorney, Law Enforcement Officer, Judge, Justice of
the Peace, Government Regulator or Defence Lawyer, it is imperative that you
understand the thinking behind search warrants, know how to properly write
or attack them, and are able to avoid the many pitfalls and problems they
raise.
This comprehensive Osgoode Professional Development program is designed
especially to provide you with the knowledge and skills you need to draft a wide
variety of search warrants with clarity and certainty, to review and revise warrants,
and to identify and develop strategies for defending/attacking the search
warrant in court.
You’ll hear from a faculty of Canada’s top Crown and defence litigators and
experienced police officers on:
• Identifying issues
• Writing to the section
• Computer searches - unique and critical drafting issues
• How to analyze and draft outlines for complex fact patterns
• Warrant execution issues, Telewarrants, Impression Warrants, Tracking Device
Warrants and other and Specialized Warrants
• Using anonymous sources
• Affiant testimony - tips, traps and techniques
The Optional Workshop (for Day One registrants only) is designed to build on the
learning in the first day of the course. You’ll draft and review portions of a warrant
based on a crime fact scenario (Note: advanced preparation is required).
This course fills up quickly. Timely registration is recommended.
 
Chairs
Scott C. Hutchison, Stockwoods LLP 
Fraser M. Kelly, General Counsel, London Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of the
Attorney General (Ontario)
OPD Program Lawyer
Mary Park
mpark@osgoode.yorku.ca
 
 
 DATE AND LOCATION
March 21, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. EDT/EST
Distance Learning Avaialble
Webcasting Requirements
 
Optional Workshop
Friday, March 22, 2013
9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
 
 
Osgoode Professional
Development Centre
1 Dundas St. W., 26th Floor
Toronto, ON
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
1 Dundas Street West, Suite 2602, Toronto, ON Canada M5G 1Z3
REGISTER NOW
AGENDA
PROGRAM FACULTY
WHO SHOULD
ATTEND
PRICE
 CREDITS
REQUEST
BROCHURE
DOWNLOAD
BROCHURE PDF
SPONSOR THIS
PROGRAM
HOTEL & PARKING
See page 28
Note-able	 Quote
“Safety searches will typically be 
warrantless, as the police will 
generally not have sufficient time to 
obtain prior judicial authorization for 
them.”
see 
page  
18
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
David and Goliath: underdogs, misfits, and the 
art of battling giants.
Malcolm Gladwell.
New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, c2013
BF 503 G53 2013
Demonstrating emotional intelligence.
[v ideorecording] . produced & dis t r ibuted by 
StressStop.com; written & directed by James E. 
Porter.
Norwalk, CT: StressStop.com, c2011.
1 videodisc (18 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Based on the books Emotional intelligence and 
Social intelligence by Daniel Goleman.
Special features: Q & A with Daniel Goleman; the 
making  of EI. Teaches the viewer the subtle art of 
reading  facial expressions, as well as the ease to 
which emotions are transferred from one person to 
another. Focuses specifically on how the emotions of 
sadness, happiness, surprise,disgust, fear and anger 
can be read and then transferred to others.
BF 576 E46 2011 pt.2 D1784
Emotional intelligence & optimal performance. 
[v ideorecord ing] . produced & d i s t r ibu ted by 
StressStop.com; written & directed by James E. 
Porter.
Norwalk, CT: StressStop.com, c2011.
1 videodisc (17 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Based on the books Emotional intelligence and 
Social intelligence by Daniel Goleman.
Special features: Q & A with Daniel Goleman; the 
making  of EI; 30 minute PowerPoint Presentation 
(PPS); participant handout (Microsoft Word).  
Teaches the viewer to identify optimal amount of 
stress in themselves, which is one of the five key 
emotional intelligence skills needed to stay highly 
motivated and engaged. Other strategies include 
learning  how to overcome overly negative thinking 
such as worry, recovering  quickly from emotional 
episodes, and how to handle disturbing  emotions in 
yourself, your coworkers, and your supervisors. The 
film presents the strategy for addressing  these issues 
as a five-step program. Steps include promoting  
self-awareness, self-regulation of the nervous system, 
challenging  overly-negative  thoughts and worries, 
recovering  quickly from emotional episodes, and 
responding empathically.
BF 576 E46 2011 pt.3 D1785
No excuses: how you can turn any workplace 
into a great one.
Jennifer Robin, Michael Burchell.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2013
HD 58.7 R625 2013
Primal leadership: unleashing  the power of 
emotional intelligence.
Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, Annie McKee.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business ReviewPress, 2013.
HD 57.7 G664 2013
Understanding emotional intelligence.
[v ideorecord ing] p roduced & d i s t r ibu ted by 
StressStop.com; written & directed by James E. 
Porter.
Norwalk, CT: StressStop.com, c2011.
1 videodisc (12 min.):  sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + CD-ROM 
(digital; 4 3/4 in.)
Accompanying  CD entitled: Relax: six techniques to 
lower your stress. Based on the  books Emotional 
intelligence and Social intelligence by Daniel 
Goleman. Special features: Q & A with Daniel 
Goleman; the making  of EI; 30 minute PowerPoint 
Presentation (PPS); participant handout (Microsoft 
Word). Teaches the viewer three basic strategies for 
handling  stress with emotional intelligence: 
Becoming  aware of emotions, self-regulating  
emotions, and recognizing  and empathizing  with the 
emotions in others.
BF 576 E46 2011 pt.1 D1783
 
www.10-8.ca
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DESPITE	 CHARTER	 BREACH	 
EVIDENCE	 ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Wright, 2013 ONCA 778
During  a police wiretap, officers 
heard communications between the 
accused and another man (Lewis) 
indicating  that the accused might 
have a firearm in one of two cars, a 
Honda or a Lexus. About an hour later a detective 
located the  two cars in the parking  lot of a  club. He 
briefed other officers in the area that there was 
reliable  information of a firearm in one of the two 
vehicles. Although the detective described the 
vehicles including  their license plate numbers, he 
did not pass on the names of the two suspects nor 
did he say the source of the information was a 
wiretap. The officers understood that they  were to 
stop  the two cars to try to determine if there was a 
firearm but had no direct order to search. The Lexus, 
driven by Lewis, was stopped but eventually  let go. 
The Honda was also stopped almost immediately 
after the Lexus. An officer smelled liquor on the 
driver’s breath. He was administered a screening 
test, registered a “warn” and received a 12-hour 
license suspension. The accused, a passenger in the 
Honda, was identified and checked on the police 
database. Information suggested he was to be 
considered “armed and dangerous”.
Since the accused also had a suspended driver’s 
license, the car was to be impounded. His demeanor 
and attitude changed once he learned the car was 
being  towed and an officer inadvertently opened the 
trunk when the release button was hit while  the keys 
were removed from the  ignition. The accused 
became very nervous and made a point of saying  the 
car was his girlfriend’s, he did not know what was in 
it and that nothing  in it belonged to him. The officers 
decided they had reasonable and probable  grounds 
to search the vehicle. In the trunk officers found a 
handgun inside a black shoulder bag  wrapped in 
some shirts. The officers never, however, considered 
whether there were exigent circumstances requiring 
an immediate search.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge concluded, based on the 
totality  of the circumstances, that the 
officers had reasonable and probable 
grounds to search the car. These grounds 
included the  reliable information about a 
gun, and the accused’s change in demeanor and 
attitude once the trunk was opened and the car was 
going  to be towed. The judge found the search of the 
vehicle’s trunk was justified under s. 117.02 of the 
Criminal Code, although he did not consider 
whether there were exigent circumstances permitting 
the officers to search without a warrant. The judge 
BY THE BOOK:
Weapons	 Search: s. 117.02 Criminal Code
s.  117.02  (1) Where a peace officer believes on 
reasonable grounds
(a)  that a weapon, an imitation firearm, a 
prohibited device, any ammunition, any 
prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance was used 
in the commission of an offence, or
(b)  that an offence is being  committed, or has been 
committed,  under any provision of this Act that involves, or 
the subject-matter of which is,  a firearm, an imitation 
firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited  weapon, a restricted 
weapon, a prohibited  device, ammunition,  prohibited 
ammunition or an explosive substance,
and  evidence of the offence is likely to be found on a 
person, in a vehicle or in any place or premises other than 
a dwelling-house, the peace officer may, where the 
conditions for obtaining  a warrant exist but, by reason  of 
exigent circumstances, it would not be practicable to 
obtain  a warrant, search, without warrant,  the person, 
vehicle, place or premises, and  seize any thing  by means 
of or in relation to which that peace officer believes on 
reasonable  grounds the offence is being  committed or has 
been committed.
“Gun violence and gun possession are matters of serious concern in our society.”
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found the search was not unreasonable under s. 8 of 
Charter. And, even if there was a s. 8  breach, the 
judge would admit the gun as evidence under s. 24
(2). The accused was convicted of possessing  a 
weapon for a dangerous purpose, unauthorized 
possession of a firearm in a vehicle and careless 
transport of a restricted weapon. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  the trial judge 
erred in concluding  the search of 
t h e t r u n k wa s r e a s o n a b l e . 
Furthermore, if his rights were  breached, he 
submitted that the evidence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). 
The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to decide 
whether there was or was not a s. 8  Charter 
violation. The gun was properly admitted under s. 24
(2):
1. The officers acted in good faith. “They did 
not decide to search the vehicle  until they 
had developed the requisite reasonable 
and probable grounds in light of unfolding 
events at the  scene of the vehicle stop,” 
said the  Court of Appeal. “They knew they 
did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds when they first stopped the 
Honda, and were only satisfied that these 
grounds developed once the  [accused] (a) 
became noticeably concerned about the police 
taking  the car, and (b)  began to dissociate 
himself from the car and its contents. Although 
the officers should have but did not advert to 
the existence of exigent circumstances or to 
officer or public safety, if that failure caused a 
breach of s. 8, it still places the seriousness of 
the Charter–infringing  conduct at the lower end 
of the spectrum on this occasion.” 
2. The impact of the breach on the accused’s 
expectation of privacy was relatively low in 
the specific circumstances of this case. “A 
person’s expectation of privacy in his (or 
his partner’s) vehicle is less than in his 
residence,” said the Appeal Court. “In this 
case, the vehicle  was about to be towed to the 
police station under the statutory authority  of s.
48(11) of the Highway Traffic  Act..., which 
permits the police to impound a vehicle  where 
the driver fails the roadside test. ... [T]he right 
to impound a vehicle also includes the right to 
inventory its contents. This further reduces the 
expectation of privacy when a vehicle is driven 
on the roads.”
3. “Gun violence and gun possession are 
matters of serious concern in our society. 
A loaded firearm is also reliable evidence 
and was essential to prove the Crown’s 
case.” 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REASONABLE	 SUSPICION	 
INVOLVES	 POSSIBILITIES,	 
NOT	 PROBABILITIES
R. v. Williams, 2013 ONCA 772
At about 7:25 pm a Major Crime 
Unit investigator answered an 
anonymous telephone call.  The 
caller said that a person was walking 
near a housing  complex with a 
gun. He was described as a black man, 5’ 8”, baby 
faced, with his hair in dreadlocks and wearing  a 
black t-shirt and jeans. The caller hung  up  when 
asked for their name. The housing  complex was a 
short distance from the police station and was well-
known to officers. The area  was referred to as a 
“stovetop” - a place  where  crack cocaine is often 
cooked on top of a stove. The police had been 
frequently called to this complex about ongoing 
problems with drugs and guns, including 
shootings.  The information about the anonymous 
call was immediately passed on to other members of 
the Major Crime Unit. They responded to the area 
within minutes and noticed a group of people. One 
individual in the group  matched the description of 
the man with the gun but his face was not initially 
visible.  
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Two officers approached the accused, identified 
themselves as police officers and said they were 
investigating  a weapons offence. One of the officers 
asked “Are you armed?” The accused did not answer 
the officer’s question.  Instead, he “bladed” –  turned 
to his side –  in a manner the officer considered 
evasive.  The other people who were with him did 
not react in the same way. One of the officers also 
noticed the accused make a movement towards the 
area of his waist.  The accused was told to put his 
hands up and to turn around.  But he did 
neither. Two officers took  control of the accused by 
his arms. He resisted, causing  the police  to consider 
their safety, as well as that of the public, to be at 
risk. An officer lifted the  accused’s baggy t-shirt and 
saw a gun butt protruding  from the  waistband of his 
pants.  He yelled “gun, gun, gun”.   The accused was 
subdued, handcuffed, and placed under arrest. The 
handgun was a fully loaded .45 calibre semi-
automatic. He was arrested and a search incident to 
his arrest resulted in the recovery of a small amount 
of marihuana.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused argued that he  was 
arbitrarily detained under s. 9 of the 
Charter because neither the anonymous 
tip  nor anything  that occurred during  the 
police encounter amounted to the  reasonable 
suspicion required to justify an investigative 
detention. The judge agreed, in part, finding  that the 
information provided in the anonymous tip  could 
not , on i t s own, jus t i fy an invest igat ive 
detention.  However, the tip  along  with what 
occurred as the officers spoke to the accused was 
sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion that he 
committed an offence. Thus, the investigative 
detention that followed was justified. Then, once  the 
gun was seen, the officers had reasonable grounds to 
make the arrest. As for the search, it was not 
unreasonable under s. 8  of the Charter. Although 
lifting  the t-shirt was not a  pat-down, it was less 
invasive than one and conducted out of concern for 
officer or public safety. Finally, even if there  were 
Charter breaches, the  judge would have admitted 
the gun and marihuana under s. 24 (2). The accused 
was convicted of several offences related to the 
possession of the handgun and the marihuana.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused reargued that he had 
been arbitrarily detained when 
approached by police. In his view, 
the  tip  did not amount to a 
reasonable suspicion nor did the subsequent events 
that followed since his responses were ambiguous 
and consistent with exercising  his right to 
silence. Plus, he submitted that he was not merely 
detained for investigation but subjected to a de facto 
arrest without the necessary  reasonably  grounded 
belief that he committed an offence.  Furthermore, 
the accused contended the search in this case 
exceeded a pat-down search and was more akin to a 
strip search. The search, he suggested, was therefore 
unreasonable and a s. 8 breach.  
Investigative Detention
The Court of Appeal first explained the police 
authority of investigative detention:
Police may detain a person for investigative 
purposes if they have reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the person is connected to particular 
criminal activity and that such a detention is 
reasonably necessary in the circumstances.  The 
standard – “reasonable grounds to suspect” – 
involves possibilities, not probabilities. We must 
take care not to conflate the test for reasonable 
suspicion with the more exacting standard of 
reasonable belief.
A reasonable suspicion entails more than a 
sincerely held subjective belief, for that is mere 
suspicion. A reasonable suspicion is a suspicion 
grounded in “objectively discernible facts, which 
could then be subjected to independent judicial 
scrutiny”.
“A reasonable suspicion entails more than a sincerely held subjective belief, for that is mere 
suspicion. A reasonable suspicion is a suspicion grounded in ‘objectively discernible facts, 
which could then be subjected to independent judicial scrutiny’.”
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To determine whether the reasonable suspicion 
standard has been met, a reviewing court must 
examine the to t a l i t y o f t he r e l evan t 
circumstances.  This examination is not some 
scientific or metaphysical exercise.  Common 
sense, flexibility, and practical everyday 
experience are to be applied through the eyes of 
a reasonable person equipped with the 
knowledge, training, and experience of the 
investigating  officer. The standard of reasonable 
suspicion is not frustrated simply because the 
factors urged in support may also give rise to an 
innocent explanation.  In the end, if the facts 
objectively indicate the possibility of criminal 
behaviour in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, the objective component of the 
reasonable suspicion standard has been satisfied.
Any elements or factors considered as part of a 
“reasonable suspicion” analysis must respect 
Charter principles.  Nor should the exercise of 
Charter rights, such as the right to remain silent 
or to walk away from questioning made outside 
the context of a detention, provide grounds for 
reasonable suspicion. Yet some factors, including 
flight from the police, may give rise to 
reasonable suspicion on their own.  Even if a 
factor cannot on its own support reasonable 
suspicion, reasonable suspicion may be 
established when the same factor is simply one 
of a constellation of factors.  The actions of a 
person after an initial encounter with the police 
are part of the circumstances to be considered in 
deciding  whether the reasonable suspicion 
threshold has been crossed. [references omitted, 
paras. 22-25]
In this case, the tip  was an important part of the 
reasonable suspicion analysis. “The tip  was current, 
described the nature of the offence being 
committed, and contained sufficient particulars of 
the suspect to enable police to immediately focus on 
the [accused] when they arrived minutes later,” said 
the Court of Appeal. “In our view, the combination 
of the anonymous tip  and what occurred when the 
[accused] encountered the police was capable of 
supporting  a reasonable belief that the [accused] 
might be connected to a gun crime as reported by 
the anonymous caller. Nothing more was required.”
Search
During  an investigative detention, the police may 
sometimes conduct a  pat-down search of the 
detainee. However, in this case, the police lifted the 
accused’s baggy t-shirt. Although, strictly speaking, 
this was not a  pat-down search, it was arguably less 
intrusive than one. “To characterize what occurred 
here  as unreasonable is to sacrifice substance for 
form,” said the Appeal Court. “In no sense could this 
search be characterized as the functional equivalent 
of a strip search.” 
Admissibility of Evidence
Since the accused had failed to demonstrate that the 
evidence – the gun and marihuana – was obtained 
in a manner that breached his rights under either ss. 
8  or 9 of the Charter, s. 24(2) did not apply. In any 
event, the trial judge properly applied s. 24(2)  if she 
was wrong in finding no Charter infringements.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE	 BEATING	 RESULTS	 IN	 
STAYED	 CHARGES
R. v. Singh, 2013 ONCA 750
The accused was arrested for robbery 
at his workplace several months after 
a copper wire heist. Another man 
was also arrested. An employee had 
been bound with zip ties and duct 
tape, and was threatened with a handgun. Copper 
piping  worth $350,000 was loaded into a vehicle 
with a forklift. After the  robbers left the employee 
freed himself and called 911. The accused was taken 
to the police station where he said he had been 
beaten by police on three separate occasions over 
an extended period of time before giving  a 
statement. 
First, he was placed in an interrogation room, strip 
searched and left alone. About 15 minutes later the 
officers returned and began questioning  him but he 
denied any involvement, including  knowing  his co-
accused (which was not true). An officer responded 
Volume 14 Issue 1 - January/February 2014
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violently to these denials, attacking  the accused for 
up  to two minutes. While pinned against the wall, 
the accused was struck  on the back and kneed in the 
ribs. The officers left, but sometime later returned 
and again responded with force after the accused 
said he knew nothing  about the robbery. His neck 
was grabbed, throat squeezed, head slammed 
against the wall and he was punched. Police 
demanded that he tell them what happened in the 
robbery. A detective said, “Tell them something, tell 
them anything  or else they’re going  to come back.”  
Receiving  no response, the  detective left. On the 
third occasion the officers opened the door with the 
accused’s co-arrestee between them. The door then 
closed and he was left alone again. Later, the officers 
returned to the interrogation room. After denying  he 
was lying  about the robbery, he was again beaten. 
He was hit on the back of the head many times and 
begged the officers to just kill him. The officers then 
left the room, while  one returned alone an hour later 
saying, “I am sorry for what I did to you. It’s part of 
my job.” After the apology, the accused was given 
food, water and a towel to clean himself up. He 
continued to deny having  anything  to do with the 
robbery during  a video statement. Ten days later, 
after his release, he visited his family doctor.
Ontario Superior Court
The accused’s co-accused was also beaten 
and the Crown voluntarily sought a  stay of 
proceedings on his charges. He required 
medical attention and X-rays subsequently 
revealed that he had a fractured rib. As for the 
accused’s charges, they proceeded and he was 
convicted of armed robbery and forcible 
confinement. The  Crown did not contest the beating 
allegations, calling  no evidence to refute them. The 
judge recognized the egregious nature of the police 
misconduct and described it as “thoroughly 
reprehensible behavior on the part of those acting  on 
behalf of the state.” However, she concluded the 
beatings did not warrant a stay under s. 24(1)  of the 
Charter in the circumstances.  The police brutality 
had not affected trial fairness, the injuries did not 
result in serious harm and the charges were very 
serious. She also concluded that there were very few 
cases in Canadian jurisprudence where a stay had 
been imposed solely as a remedy for police brutality. 
The judge did, however, reduce the accused’s 
sentence by one year in consideration of the police 
misconduct. He was sentenced to 5 ½ years.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the police 
misconduct was so egregious that a 
stay of conviction was warranted. 
The Court of Appeal agreed. 
“Canadian society  cannot tolerate – and the courts 
cannot permit – police officers to beat suspects in 
order to obtain confessions,” said Justice Blair. “Yet, 
sadly, that is precisely what happened in this case.  
One of the  two police  officers who participated in 
the beatings apparently thought, as he said, that ‘it’s 
part of [his] job’ to do so. It is not.” In a footnote to 
its ruling, the Court of Appeal stated “the conduct in 
this case might well be characterized as ‘torture’ as 
that term is defined in s. 269.1(2) of the Criminal 
Code.”
Stay
Although a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) is 
usually rare when trial fairness is not an issue, this 
was one such case were a stay was warranted under 
the residual category. The residual category permits 
judicial discretion in granting  a stay, even where trial 
fairness is not at issue, if (1)  ”the prejudice caused 
by the abuse in question will be  manifested, 
perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of 
the trial, or by its outcome” and (2)  “no other 
remedy is reasonably  capable of removing  that 
prejudice.” In this case, the trial judge failed to 
“direct her mind to the nature of the police 
misconduct in the context of its potential systemic 
ramifications and the need to consider its impact 
upon the integrity of the judicial process”:
The serious nature of the charges in question, the 
absence of trial fairness issues, and the nature of 
the injuries inflicted are all important factors in 
the balancing exercise that leads to the grant or 
refusal of a stay of proceedings.  None is 
controlling, however, where – as here – the 
conduct involved goes to the heart of the 
integrity of the justice system. …
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What occurred here was not a momentary 
overreaction by a police officer caught up in the 
moment of a difficult interrogation.  What 
occurred here was the administration of a 
c a l c u l a t e d , p r o l o n g e d a n d s k i l l f u l l y 
choreographed invest igat ive technique 
developed by these officers to secure evidence. 
This technique involved the deliberate and 
repeated use of intimidation, threats and 
violence, coupled with what can only be 
described as a systematic breach of the 
constitutional rights of detained persons – 
including  the denial of their rights to counsel. It 
would be naïve to suppose that this type of 
egregious conduct, on the part of these officers, 
would be confined to an isolated incident.
The courts must not condone such an approach 
to interrogation.   Real life in the police services 
is not a television drama. What took place here 
sullies the reputations of the many good officers 
in our country, whose work is integral to the 
safety and security of our society. [42-44]
In addition, the police refused to respond to the 
allegations. An internal investigation was stopped 
when the victims were unwilling  to cooperate. 
Further, no charges, disciplinary measures or other 
consequences flowing  from the investigation were 
reported to the  court. In granting  the stay, Justice 
Blair stated:
Balancing  all of the competing interests at play 
in contemplating  a stay of proceedings – the 
seriousness of the offence and society’s interest 
in upholding a conviction, the integrity of the 
justice system, and the nature and gravity of the 
violation of the [accused’s] rights – I am satisfied 
that a stay is warranted and should have been 
imposed.  The state misconduct was a flagrant 
breach of the [accused’s] Charter-protected 
rights.  The prolonged and grave nature of the 
beatings, and the careful choreography 
underlying  them, suggest a pattern of 
misconduct on the part of [the officers] that has 
systemic implications. That similar assaults were 
committed against the [accused’s] co-accused 
reinforces this concern. 
[A] stay of the convictions is necessary “to 
prevent the perpetuation of a wrong  that, if left 
alone, will continue to trouble the parties and 
the community as a whole in the future.” [para. 
48-49]
The accused’s appeal was allowed and a stay of 
convictions was entered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
                         
NO	 RIGHT	 TO	 LAWYER	 BEFORE	 
COMPLETING	 POLICE	 NOTES
Wood v. Schaeffer, 2013 SCC 71
Two men were shot and killed by 
police in separate incidents. In both 
cases the  men failed to comply with 
police  commands to drop their 
knives and they were shot after they 
advanced on police. During  the subsequent 
investigations into the shootings by Ontario’s Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU)  - the investigating  body of 
fatal police shootings - the involved officers were 
instructed by senior officers not to write any notes 
until they had spoken to a lawyer. Under a 
provincial regulation, both subject and witness 
officers are required to complete their notes on an 
incident in accordance with their duty. The 
regulation, however, also provides all officers with 
an entitlement to consult legal counsel and to have 
counsel present during  their SIU interviews. In both 
cases, charges were not brought against the officers 
by the SIU. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The families of the two deceased brought 
an action seeking  judicial interpretation 
of Ontario’s Police Services Act and its 
regulations governing  the conduct of SIU 
“Canadian society cannot tolerate – and the courts cannot permit – police officers to beat 
suspects in order to obtain confessions.  Yet, sadly, that is precisely what happened in this 
case.  One of the two police officers who participated in the beatings apparently thought, 
as he said, that ‘it’s part of [his] job’ to do so. It is not.”
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investigations, including  whether the legislative 
scheme permits officers to consult with counsel 
before completing  their notes. The judge allowed a 
motion brought by the officers to strike the 
application on procedural grounds and, therefore, 
the issue was not litigated.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The families challenged the 
Superior Court’s ruling. The Court 
of Appeal concluded that the 
regulations did not permit police 
officers to speak with a lawyer for the purpose of 
assisting  them in completing  their notes. In its view, 
the assistance of a  lawyer in preparing  notes would 
be inconsistent with the purpose of a police officer’s 
notes and their duty  to prepare them. Any legal 
advice would be geared towards the officer’s own 
self-interest or the interests of their colleagues rather 
than the public’s interest. However, the Court of 
Appeal did find officers were entitled to basic legal 
advice before completing  their notes regarding  the 
nature of their rights and obligations in connection 
with the SIU investigations. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The officers then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada contending  that their entitlement to counsel 
was not limited to mere basic legal advice. The SIU 
Director also appealed, suggesting  officers were not 
even entitled to basic legal advice before completing 
their notes. The families and the OPP Commissioner, 
on the other hand, felt the Ontario Court of Appeal 
got it right. The question for the Supreme Court was 
whether the regulation entitled officers involved in 
SIU investigations to speak with a lawyer before 
completing  their notes and the scope, if any, of such 
an entitlement. 
Majority
A six member majority made 
clear that this case addressed 
the scope of an officer’s 
entitlement to counsel flowing 
from a regulatory  provision. 
Unlike ordinary citizens who, 
at common law, generally may consult with counsel 
as and when they see fit, the police officers were not 
acting  in their capacity as ordinary citizens but in 
their professional capacity as police officers. “So 
long  as police officers choose  to wear the badge, 
they must comply wi th thei r dut ies and 
responsibilities under the  regulation, even if this 
means at times having  to forego liberties they would 
otherwise  enjoy as ordinary citizens,” said Justice 
Moldaver. The regulation governs situations where 
officers have been involved in an incident resulting 
in serious injury or death and comprehensively sets 
out their rights and duties, including  their 
entitlement to counsel. 
Note-making
The majority concluded that the regulations did not 
entitle officers to consult with counsel before they 
had completed their notes - either to get assistance 
in preparing  them or to obtain “basic legal advice.” 
The argument that the regulations did provide a 
freestanding  entitlement to consult counsel at the 
note-making  stage was rejected because it was 
BY THE BOOK:
Ontario’s Police 	 Services	 Act: Conduct and 
Duties of Police Officers Respecting Investigations 
by the Special Investigations Unit
s. 7 (1) Subject to subsection (2), every 
police officer is entitled to consult with 
legal counsel or a representative of a 
police association and to have legal 
counsel or a representative of a police 
association present during his or her interview with 
the SIU.
s. 9 (1) A witness officer shall complete in full the 
notes on the incident in accordance with his or her 
duty and ... shall provide the notes to the chief of 
police within 24 hours after a request for the notes is 
made by the SIU.
(3) A subject officer shall complete in full the notes 
on the incident in accordance with his or her duty, 
but no member of the police force shall provide 
copies of the notes at the request of the SIU.
... ... ...
... ... ...
Volume 14 Issue 1 - January/February 2014
PAGE 11
inconsistent with (1)  the dominant purpose  of the 
legislative scheme, (2) the  legislative intent behind 
the regulation and (3) an officer’s duty to make 
notes.
1. Legislative Purpose. The civilian SIU and the 
purpose of the legislative scheme was created 
to address the public’s confidence in police 
investigations into fatal police  shootings. 
Having  the police investigate themselves 
bore the appearance that investigations 
were not impartial and police were 
protecting  their own. Allowing  officers 
to consult a lawyer at the note-making 
stage  would add to this appearance. “A 
reasonable member of the public would 
naturally question whether counsel’s 
assistance at the note-making  stage is 
sought by officers to help  them fulfill 
their duties as police  officers, or if it is 
instead sought, in their self-interest, to 
protect themselves and their colleagues 
from the potential liability of an adverse 
S IU inves t iga t ion,” sa id Jus t ice 
Moldaver. “Public trust in the police is, 
and always must be, of paramount 
concern.  This concern requires that officers 
prepare their notes without the assistance of 
counsel. Consultations with counsel during  the 
note-making  stage are antithetical to the very 
purpose of the legislative scheme.”
2. Legislative Intent.  The legislative history  of the 
regulation demonstrated that the provisions 
were never meant to provide an entitlement to 
consult counsel at the note-making  stage. The 
recommendations that led to the legislation 
never mentioned the role of counsel at the 
note-making  s tage. The government ’s 
knowledge that there was a practice of officers 
consulting  counsel prior to preparing  notes and 
not amending  the regulation to forbid the 
practice did not change the legislature’s intent.
3. Duty to Make Notes.  Allowing  an officer to 
talk to a  lawyer and obtain legal advice before 
preparing  their notes conflicts with a police 
officer’s duty to prepare accurate, detailed and 
comprehensive notes as soon as practicable 
after an incident. In the Court’s view, 
expanding  the right of consultation to the note-
making  stage would create the real risk that an 
officer’s notes will shift - either 
overtly or subtly - away from their 
public duty  to make accurate, 
d e t a i l e d n o t e s a b o u t wh a t 
happened and move toward their 
private interest in justifying  or 
explaining  why it happened. “The 
purpose of notes is not to explain or 
justify  the facts, but simply to set 
them out,” said Justice Moldaver. 
“An officer’s notes are not meant to 
provide a  ‘ lawyer-enhanced’ 
justification for what has occurred.  
They are simply meant to record an 
event, so that others — like the SIU 
Director — can rely on them to 
determine what happened.”
The Supreme Court recognized that police officers 
involved in a traumatic event may need to speak to 
someone before completing  their notes. The 
regulation, however, prevents officers from speaking 
to counsel, not doctors, mental health professionals 
or uninvolved senior police officers before writing 
up  their notes. And, of course, once officers have 
completed their notes and filed them with their 
chief, they are free to talk to a lawyer. 
In conclusion, the majority  found that police officers 
are not permitted to have the assistance of counsel 
in the preparation of their notes nor are they entitled 
to receive basic legal advice as to the nature of their 
rights and duties prior to completing  their notes. As 
a result, the SIU Director’s appeal was allowed 
while the officers’ appeal was dismissed. 
“So long as police officers choose to wear the badge, they must comply with their duties 
and responsibilities under the regulation, even if this means at times having to forego 
liberties they would otherwise enjoy as ordinary citizens.”
“The purpose of 
notes is not to 
explain or justify 
the facts, but 
simply to set them 
out. An officer’s 
notes are not 
meant to provide a 
‘lawyer-enhanced’ 
justification for 
what has 
occurred.”
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A Different View
Three justices agreed that it was 
inconsistent with an officer’s duty 
to complete independent, timely 
and comprehensive notes if they 
sought legal advice which would influence the 
contents of those notes. “Police  officers should not 
be allowed to consult about the  drafting  of the  notes 
themselves where such consultation affects the 
independence of notes,” said the minority. “The 
contents and drafting  of the notes should not be 
discussed with counsel. The drafting  should not be 
directed or reviewed by counsel.  The notes must 
remain the result of a police officer’s independent 
account of the events.” However, the minority 
opined that access to a lawyer should not be limited 
altogether. Rather, in its view, police officers should 
be allowed to talk  to counsel to obtain basic legal 
advice, not about the content of notes, but about the 
steps and procedures of an SIU investigation. The 
minority would have upheld the Ontario Court of 
Appeal’s decision and dismissed all appeals. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
QUESTIONING	 WAS	 
INVESTIGATIVE,	 NOT	 AN	 
OPPORTUNITY	 TO	 COMMIT	 
CRIME
R. v. Ralph, 2014 ONCA 3
The police received a tip  about a 
person using  a particular telephone 
number to sell drugs. An undercover 
officer called the number and left a 
message for the person to call him 
back. Forty-one minutes later a male called back and 
had a conversation with the officer (see text box). As 
a result of the conversation, the undercover officer 
met with the accused later that night and purchased 
1.6  grams of cocaine. The officer then met with the 
accused on several more occasions, purchasing 
increasingly larger amounts of crack and powder 
cocaine. The accused also offered to sell a  firearm to 
the officer. When the accused was arrested the 
police seized a quantity of cocaine. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused was convicted on multiple 
charges of trafficking  in cocaine, 
possession of the proceeds of crime, 
possessing  cocaine for the  purpose of 
trafficking  and offering  to transfer a firearm. 
However, he argued that the charges should have 
been stayed because he was entrapped. But the 
judge disagreed, finding  there was no entrapment. In 
the judge’s view, the anonymous telephone tip by 
itself was not enough to generate a reasonable 
suspicion the accused was a drug  trafficker. The 
police, however, were nonetheless permitted to 
pursue the tip by calling  the number to investigate 
and confirm information as long  as they did not offer 
an opportunity to commit a crime until they had a 
reasonable suspicion. In this case, the officer’s 
comment - “I need product” - did not amount to 
providing  the target with an opportunity to commit 
the crime of trafficking. Rather it was investigative in 
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
Here is the exchange when the accused called the officer 
back:
Officer:   Hello?
Accused: You called me and left a message.
Officer:   Yeah, what’s going on?
Accused: Who’s this?
Officer:   [gives his undercover name].
Accused: Okay, how’d you get my number?
Officer:    I was at Jane and Finch and a kid said that if I want 
anything to call this number and this guy would link 
me up ... I need product [meaning I’m looking to 
buy drugs.]
Accused: Okay, so what are you looking for? What do you 
need?
Officer:    I need a half [meaning one half of an eight-ball of 
crack cocaine.]
Accused: Okay, the small thing, that’s it?
Officer:    Yeah, hard, white [meaning crack cocaine] ... where 
are you?
Accused: I’m at Weston Road. Meet me at Scarletwood.
Officer:    I’ll call you back at 7:30. How much?
Accused: A bill [meaning $100.]
Officer:   What’s your name?
Accused: Blacus.
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nature. The opportunity  to commit a crime occurred 
later when specific drugs were  solicited and an 
order for drugs was placed (ie. when the officer said 
he needed “a half-ball”). The accused failed to 
establish on a balance of probabilities that the police 
did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was a 
drug  dealer when the opportunity  to commit the 
crime was offered. He was sentenced to three years 
in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among other 
things, that the  trial judge erred in 
finding  that he was not entrapped. 
He submitted that the police did 
not have a reasonable suspicion before  giving  him 
an opportunity to commit an offence and therefore 
he was subject to random virtue testing. In his view, 
the opportunity to commit an offence occurred 
when the officer said: “I was at Jane and Finch and a 
kid said that if I want anything  to call this number 
and this guy would link me up  ... I need product.” At 
this point, he contended the officer did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that he was involved in drug 
trafficking. 
Justice Rosenberg, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, agreed with the trial judge. The officer’s 
statement, “I was at Jane and Finch and a kid said 
that if I want anything  to call this number and this 
guy would link me up ... I need product,” was part of 
the investigation rather than an opportunity to 
commit a crime. “[I]t was a legitimate investigative 
step,” said Justice Rosenberg. “When the  [accused] 
responded as he did, this response together with the 
anonymous tip was ... sufficient to provide the 
officer with reasonable suspicion and justify the 
further statements from the officer. This was not a 
case of random virtue testing  and entrapment was 
not made out.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“If you think you can do a thing  or think you can't 
do a thing, you're right.” - Henry Ford
WAITING	 FOR	 UNLAWFUL	 TOW:	 
SAMPLES	 NOT	 TAKEN	 AS	 SOON	 
AS	 PRACTICABLE
R. v. Wetzel, 2013 SKCA 143
 
After receiving  a tip  about the 
manner in which a van with a trailer 
was being  driven, the police  pulled it 
over. The accused stopped the 
vehicle “partially” in a bus stop. A 
breath sample was demanded at 11:55 pm and the 
officers waited 35 minutes with the accused for a 
tow truck to arrive. After the tow truck arrived the 
officers waited an additional 12 minutes while the 
van was hauled away. The accused was taken to the 
police station where breath samples were obtained 
at 1:25 am (140mg%)  and 1:50 am (130mg%). He 
was charged with driving while over 80 mg%.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
Among  other things, the trial judge found 
the first breath sample was not taken “as 
soon as practicable” under the Criminal 
Code. Although the police offered several 
reasons why the vehicle was towed, the judge found 
the true reason was because it was the officer’s 
practice to do so whenever he arrested a possible 
impaired driver. In other words, the 35 minute delay 
resulted from the officer’s general policy to always 
call a tow truck when dealing  with impaired drivers 
regardless of the circumstances. “I can think of no 
rationale for a blanket policy of that nature; indeed, 
none was offered,” said the judge. “Whether or not 
this is simply [the officer’s] own way of punishing 
drivers he considers to be impaired, it is not 
appropriate, nor is it lawful.” 
Since the tow was unlawful, it was not reasonable to 
wait 35 minutes for the tow truck to arrive. 
Therefore, the breath tests were not taken as soon as 
practicable. The Criminal Code presumption of 
identity  under s. 258(1)(c)(ii)  could not be relied 
upon and the accused was acquitted. 
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Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed the acquittal 
arguing, among  several grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in holding  that the breath 
samples were not taken as soon as 
practicable. The appeal judge agreed, finding  the 
trial judge made a legal mistake in concluding  that 
towing  the accused’s vehicle from the bus stop  was 
not lawful. The trial judge did not consider that the 
vehicle was parked “partially” in a bus stop and 
therefore constituted a hazard within the meaning  of 
s. 280(1)(a)(ii) of Saskatchewan's Traffic Safety Act 
(TSA). A conviction was entered and the matter 
remitted to the trial judge for sentencing. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
A further appeal, this time by the 
accused, was successful. A majority 
of the Court of Appeal found it was 
open to the trial judge to conclude 
from the officer’s evidence that the tow truck was 
called because he had a general policy to do so with 
impaired drivers. The appeal judge erred in ruling 
that the tow truck was called because the van and 
trailer were parked in a bus stop. The Crown also 
asserted that even if a blanket policy of always 
calling  a tow truck was the  reason to do so, calling  a 
tow truck could still be legal under the TSA. But this 
position was rejected. Justice Jackson stated:  
Section 280(1)(a)(ii) of The Traffic Safety Act 
permits a peace officer, without warrant, to seize 
any vehicle or combination of vehicles “that the 
peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe”  constitutes a hazard.  Since the trial 
judge rejected [the officer’s] evidence that he 
called the tow truck because it was in the bus 
stop, and I have concluded that his finding in 
that regard is supported by the evidence, no 
foundation existed for the summary conviction 
appeal court judge to conclude that [the officer] 
had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
vehicles constituted a hazard under s. 280(1)(a)
(ii) of The Traffic Safety Act.  
Since the officer did not have the necessary  grounds, 
a court could not fill the gap.  
A Different View
Justice Ottenbriet disagreed with the 
majority on this point. In his view, three 
explanations for why the van and trailer 
had been towed were provided by the 
officer including  the fact they were  in a bus stop. 
Since the trial judge did not explore whether the 
presence of the vehicles in the bus stop constituted a 
hazard within the meaning  of s. 280(1)  and therefore 
provided a  lawful basis for the tow, he did not 
properly consider whether the breath samples were 
taken as soon as practicable. But the appeal judge 
did, finding  there was a lawful basis for the tow and 
rightly concluded that the delay did not, for that 
reason, result in the  accused’s breath samples not 
being  taken as soon as practicable. “In this case, 
there  was a reasonable explanation for the delay 
based on a lawful seizure  of the vehicles,” said 
Justice Ottenbreit. “The delay of 35 minutes was not 
unreasonable in itself. The tests were taken within a 
reasonably prompt time under the circumstances.”
 
The accused’s conviction appeal was allowed and 
his acquittal restored.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Saskatchewan’s	 Traffic Safety Act: s. 280
s. 280 (1) A peace officer, without warrant, may:
(a) seize any vehicle  or combination of vehicles 
that the peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe:
(i) is  being  driven in contravention of this Act or the 
regulations; or
(ii) is  parked  on a highway at a place, or in a manner, that 
constitutes a hazard to other users of the highway; and
(b)  retain the vehicle in the peace officer's possession or 
store the vehicle or combination of vehicles in a suitable 
place.
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ON-DUTY	 DEATHS	 RISE
On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada rose by one last year over 
2012. In 2013  six  peace  officers lost 
their lives on the job  as reported by 
the Officer Down Memorial Page. 
Once again motor vehicles, not guns, posed the 
greatest risk  to officers and continue  to do so as the 
last 10 years suggest. Since 2004, 24 officers have 
lost their lives in circumstances involving  vehicles, 
including  automobile accidents (16), vehicular 
assault (6)  and being  struck by a vehicle (2). These 
deaths account for nearly 44% of all on-duty deaths, 
which is much higher than the next leading  cause of 
gunfire (14) in the same 10 year period. On average, 
11 officers lost their lives every two years during  the 
last decade, while 2005 had the most deaths at 11. 
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Fish	 &	 Wildlife	 Officer	 Howard	 Lavers
Newfoundland	 &	 Labrador	 Fish	 and	 
Wildlife	 Enforcement	 Division,	 NL
End	 of	 Watch:	 February	 21,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Drowning
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Constable	 Steve	 Dery
Kativik	 Regional	 Police	 Force,	 QC
End	 of	 Watch:	 March	 2,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Gunfire
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2013 Average Tour: 15 years 4 months
2013 Average Age: 33
2013 Deaths by Gender: female - 1
    male - 5
2013 Deaths by Province:
✴ Ontario - 3
✴ Quebec - 1
✴ Saskatchewan - 1
✴ Newfoundland & Labrador - 1 
Constable	 Jennifer	 Kovach
Guelph	 Police	 Service,	 ON
End	 of	 Watch:	 March	 14,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Automobile	 Accident
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2013 Deaths by Cause:
✴ automobile accident - 2
✴ vehicular assault - 1
✴ gunfire - 1
✴ drowning - 1
✴ training accident - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 7
✴ male - 48
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed February 1, 2014]
Conservation	 Officer	 Justin	 Knackstedt
Saskatchewan	 Environment	 &	 Resource	 
Management,	 SK
End	 of	 Watch:	 May	 31,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Vehicular	 Assault
Constable	 Michael	 Pegg
York	 Regional	 Police	 Service,	 ON
End	 of	 Watch:	 November	 29,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Training	 Accident
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Constable	 John	 Zivcic
Toronto	 Police	 Service,	 ON
End	 of	 Watch:	 December	 2,	 2013
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Automobile	 Accident
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2
Assault 1 1 2
Auto accident 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 16
Drowned 1 1 1 3
Duty related illness 1 1
Gunfire 1 1 3 3 5 1 14
Heart attack 1 1 2 4
Natural disaster 2 2
Stabbed 1 1 2
Struck by vehicle 1 1 2
Training accident 1 1
Vehicular assault 1 2 1 1 1 6
Total 6 5 3 7 4 2 4 6 11 7 55
Female 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 7
Male 5 4 3 6 3 2 4 5 10 6 48
POLICE	 ASSAULTS
According  to a Statistics Canada report, “Police-
reported crime statistics in  Canada, 2012,” 
assaulting  a police officer dropped (-8%) from 2011 
to 2012. In 2012 there were 10,612 assault police 
officer offences compared to 11,424 the previous 
year. However, from 2002 to 2012, assaults against 
police have risen 12%. This increase  may be 
attributable to offences of assault with weapon/CBH 
to a peace officer and aggravated assault against a 
peace officer being  added to the  Criminal Code 
during  this time period. These offences would have 
previously been reported under the general assault 
with weapon/CBH or aggravated assault provisions. 
For other assaults in 2012, there were 169,996 
reports of common assault (level 1), 49,537 assaults 
with a weapon or bodily harm (level 2)  and 3,968 
offences of aggravated assault (level 3). 
13%
87%
On-Duty Deaths 2004-2012 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2013, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2012”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 25, 2013.
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U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2013 2012
911 relatd illness 1 4
Aircraft accident 1 3
Assault - 1
Automobile accident 26 21
Boating Accident 1 -
Bomb 1 -
Drowned 2 -
Duty related illness 1 3
Electrocuted 1
Fall 4 2
Fire 1 -
Gunfire 31 47
Gunfire (accidental) 2 2
Heart attack 16 6
Heat exhaustion - 1
Motorcycle accident 4 5
Stabbed 2 5
Struck by vehicle 8 6
Training accident 2 1
Vehicle pursuit 4 5
Vehicular assault 5 11
Total 113 123
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2004-2013)
Year 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Total
Deaths 113 124 177 177 140 154 203 161 165 166 1580
Avg. age 43 41 41 42 40 40 40 38 39 40
Avg. tour 14 yrs.
0 mos.
12 yrs.
1 mos.
13 yrs.
4 mos.
12 yrs.
2 mos.
11 yrs.
11 mos.
11 yrs.
11 mos.
11 yrs.
5 mos.
11 yrs.
5 mos.
11 yrs.
1 mos.
12 yrs.
10 mos.
Female 4 12 11 10 3 13 9 9 5 9 85
Male 109 112 166 167 137 141 194 152 160 157 1495
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS INCREASE
During  2013  the U.S. lost 113 
peace officers, down 11 from 
2012. The top cause of death 
was gunfire (31) followed by 
automobile accidents (26), heart 
attack (16)  and being  struck by a 
vehicle (8). 
Texas lost the most officers for 
the seventh consecutive year at 13  - followed by the U.S. 
Government (11), California (10), Mississippi (7), New York (7), 
Arkansas (6), Louisiana (5),  Florida 
(4), Illinois (4), Alabama (4), 
Georgia (3), Michigan (3) and 
Pennsylvania  (3).  The average age 
of deceased officers was 42 years 
while the average tour of duty  was 
13  years and 10 months. Men 
accounted for 96% of officer 
deaths while women made up 4%. 
Females
4%
Males
96%
Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed February 23, 2014]
“It Is Not How These Officers Died That 
Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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SAFETY	 SEARCH	 SANCTIONED
R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3
A condominium building's concierge 
received a noise complaint one 
evening  about loud music coming 
f rom the accused’s uni t .  The 
concierge went to the unit, heard the 
loud music  and knocked on the door. He received 
no response but, just as he was about to leave, saw 
guests leaving  the unit and saying  good night. After 
being  asked to turn the music down the accused 
refused and swore at the concierge. Police were 
contacted and attended to address the noise 
complaint. A constable went to the accused’s unit 
with the concierge, knocked and asked the accused 
to turn his music down or off. The accused swore at 
the officer and slammed the door shut. 
The constable contacted her sergeant. He arrived 
about 30 minutes later and went to the unit. The 
sergeant knocked and kicked at the door, identifying 
himself as police. Five minutes later the accused 
partially  opened the door only  about 16  inches, 
enough to see the right side of his body and 
face.  The sergeant noticed something  “black and 
shiny” in the accused’s right hand. It was in a 
shadow and partially hidden by his right leg. The 
sergeant believed it might be a knife and twice 
asked what was behind the  accused’s leg, gesturing 
toward it with his hand. When the accused did not 
respond, the sergeant wanted a better look. He 
pushed the door open a  few inches further, saw it 
was a handgun, yelled “gun!” and forced his way 
into the condo. After a struggle the accused was 
disarmed and found to have a loaded 9mm Beretta 
which was registered to him at his home in 
Alberta.  He was charged with several offences 
including  careless handling, possessing  a weapon 
for a dangerous purpose and unauthorized 
possession of a loaded restricted firearm.
 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
The judge found that the police action in 
pushing  the door open a few inches to 
determine what the accused was holding 
was justified in the interests of officer 
safety. In his view, an officer is permitted to enter a 
home to ensure his or her safety, particularly  when 
the intrusion is minor. There was no Charter breach 
and the accused was convicted of  Criminal Code 
sections 86(1), 88(1) and 95(1), sentenced to three 
years in prison, his gun was forfeited and a weapons 
prohibition was imposed.  
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing, among  other 
things, that the trial judge erred by 
failing  to find a Charter breach 
when police entered his home. A majority of the 
Appeal Court disagreed. In its opinion the police 
have a common law power to search without a 
warrant where their safety or the safety of the public 
is at stake provided they had no other feasible, less 
intrusive alternative and the search is carried out in a 
reasonable manner. Here, the police acted lawfully 
in approaching  the accused’s door to deal with a 
noise complaint.  The sergeant acted reasonably in 
pushing  the door open to see what the  accused was 
hiding. By that time it was too late to retreat or issue 
a noise violation ticket. 
Justice Beveridge, writing  a dissenting  opinion, 
concluded that the sergeant breached s. 8  of the 
Charter by pushing  the door open further and 
extending  his hand into the accused’s home.  In his 
view, the  sergeant did not have reasonable  grounds 
to believe  that his safety, or the safety of others, was 
at risk and his search in pushing  open the door was 
not reasonably necessary in the circumstances. 
Instead, the sergeant was acting  on something  akin 
to a suspicion or hunch.  Justice Beveridge would 
have excluded the firearm as evidence, set aside the 
convictions and directed acquittals on all weapons 
charges. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused further appealed, again arguing  that the 
police action in pushing  the door open was an 
unreasonable search and therefore the  firearm 
should have been excluded as evidence under s. 24
(2). The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
agreed that the police did not breach s. 8  of the 
Charter, but were split (4:3) on the route to get there.
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Majority
Justice Lebel, writing  a four 
judge majority opinion, 
found the actions of the 
sergeant did amount to a 
search. People have a strong  expectation of privacy 
in their homes. Although the police have an implied 
licence to approach the door of a residence and 
knock, if they exceed the  conditions of the licence 
their actions constitute a search. The police were 
within the  conditions of implied licence when they 
went to the accused’s door and knocked (and even 
kicked at it)  to tell the occupant 
to tu rn down the  mus ic . 
However, the police exceeded 
the implied licence waiver 
when, after the accused opened 
the door, they pushed it further 
open. This action constituted an 
intrusion upon the accused’s 
reasonable privacy interest in his 
dwelling  - a search. Even though 
the officer only pushed the door 
open slightly  further, police  could now see more of 
the interior of the  unit which potentially revealed 
any number of things about the accused. 
Justice Lebel termed the type of action by police in 
this case as a “safety  search” - a reactionary measure 
to eliminate threats to the safety of the public or the 
police. He described it as a “physical search that 
could uncover a broad array of information about an 
individual.” 
Safety Searches
“Although such searches may arise in a wide variety 
of contexts, they will generally  be unplanned, as 
they will be carried out in response to dangerous 
situations created by individuals, to which the police 
must react ‘on the sudden’,” Justice Lebel said. 
A warrantless search will be  reasonable if it is 
authorized by a reasonable  law and is carried out in 
a reasonable manner. In this case, the majority 
found that “the duty of police officers to protect life 
and safety may justify the power to conduct a  safety 
search in certain circumstances. At the  very least, 
where  a  search is reasonably necessary to eliminate 
an imminent threat to the safety of the public or the 
police, the police should have the power to conduct 
the search.” This power to search, however, is not 
unbridled. To exercise this power, a police officer 
requires reasonable grounds to believe that there  is 
an imminent threat to the safety of the public or the 
police before a safety search will 
be deemed reasonable. Police 
must have more than a hunch or 
a vague concern for safety. They 
must act on objectively  verifiable 
circumstances.  
In this case, the majority found 
the officer had “reasonable 
grounds to believe that there was 
an imminent threat to the  safety 
of the public  or the police and that the search was 
necessary  in order to eliminate  that threat.” The 
accused had his hand behind his leg, was clearly 
holding  a “black and shiny” object which could 
have been a weapon, and refused to answer or to 
provide any explanation when twice asked what he 
had behind his back.
As for the  manner of a safety  search, it must be 
conducted reasonably. It must not exceed what is 
required to search for weapons and must be 
reasonably necessary to eliminate any threat in light 
of the totality of the circumstances. Here, the officer 
did no more than was necessary by pushing  the door 
open further to see what the accused had behind his 
leg. He had twice asked what the accused had in his 
hand but received no answer.  “ In these 
circumstances, it is hard to imagine  a less invasive 
way of determining  whether [the accused] was 
“[S]afety searches will typically 
be warrantless, as the police will 
generally not have sufficient time 
to obtain prior judicial 
authorization for them. In a 
sense, such searches are driven 
by exigent circumstances.”
“The duty of police officers to protect life and safety may justify the power to conduct a 
safety search in certain circumstances. At the very least, where a search is reasonably 
necessary to eliminate an imminent threat to the safety of the public or the police, the police 
should have the power to conduct the search.”
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concealing  a weapon (and thereby eliminating  any 
threat in that regard),” said Justice Lebel. This search 
was reasonable, there was no s. 8  Charter breach 
and no need to consider s. 24(2). 
Minority
A three member minority  agreed 
that there was no s. 8  Charter 
violation, but found the test 
should be reasonable grounds to 
“suspect” an individual was armed and dangerous 
rather than reasonable grounds to “believe”. The 
minority was quite critical of this distinction going 
so far as to state:
We should be clear about the consequences of 
the majority’s decision:  officers are deprived of 
the ability to conduct protective searches except 
in circumstances where they already have 
grounds to arrest.  As of today, officers are 
empowered to detain individuals they suspect 
are armed and dangerous for investigatory 
purposes, but they have no power to conduct 
pat-down searches to ensure their safety or the 
safety of the public as they conduct these 
investigations. In our view, a police officer in the 
field, faced with a realistic risk of imminent 
harm, should be able to act immediately and 
take reasonable steps, in the form of a minimally 
intrusive safety search, to alleviate the risk.    [at 
para. 91]
The accused’s appeal on the s. 8  Charter issue was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
SIGN	 BARRING	 POLICE	 DID	 NOT	 
CREATE	 PRIVACY	 EXPECTATION
R. v. Felger, 2014 BCCA 34
The accused Felger owned and 
operated a store that sold a variety 
of marihuana-related products. On 
the store window, adjacent to the 
door, the accused posted a sign 
which read: “No Police Officers Allowed In The 
Store  Without A Warrant. Especially Badges #315 & 
325.”   His lawyer also wrote a letter to the local 
police chief instructing  that no police  officers were 
permitted to enter the store without a warrant. The 
chief wrote back, asking  the lawyer to clarify with 
his client that the police do not always need a 
warrant to enter a premises.
Acting  on information that marihuana was being 
sold to minors at the store, undercover police 
officers entered it and subsequently bought 
marihuana on five separate  days. They also saw 
other individuals buy marihuana.  The accused was 
charged with six  counts of trafficking  and one count 
of possession for the purpose of trafficking. A female 
employee Healy was jointly charged with three 
counts of trafficking. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge concluded that the actions of 
the undercover officers breached the 
accuseds’ s. 8 Charter rights and 
excluded the  evidence. This evidence 
included the information that marihuana could be 
purchased by the public, the purchased marihuana 
itself and various observations, such as the smell of 
burned marihuana, and the accuseds weighing 
marihuana and retrieving  it from the back of the 
store. In the judge’s view, Felger, as lessee, had the 
right to exclude  any person or persons from the 
premises unless they had some lawful authority to 
enter. The employee also had the right to enforce her 
employer’s policies regarding  who could and could 
not enter the  store. By posting  a  sign and sending  a 
letter to the police department, Felger had limited 
the implied waiver to enter the retail store and 
maintained his privacy rights with respect to police 
officers. Explicitly  barring  the  police made their 
subsequent entry  and observations within an 
intrusion into the  accuseds’ reasonable privacy 
interests. They were acquitted. 
No Police Officers Allowed In 
The Store Without A Warrant. 
Especially Badges #315 & 325
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the actions 
of the police did not breach any 
objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy that the accuseds had in 
the business premise and that the trial judge erred in 
so finding. In the Crown’s view, the accuseds 
extended an invitation to the public  to enter the 
store, which included undercover officers posing  as 
members of the public. Further, even if there was a 
Charter breach, the  Crown suggested the evidence 
should have been admitted under s. 24(2). The 
accuseds, on the other hand, submitted that an 
individual could preserve a general prohibition 
against police, uniformed or undercover, from 
entering  private  property without permission (or 
without some other lawful authority). 
Justice Garson, authoring  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, concluded that a  person cannot create a 
privacy interest under s. 8 in a publicly accessible 
retail establishment by posting  a sign prohibiting 
entry  by police  officers. A reasonable expectation of 
privacy is to be determined on basis of the totality of 
the circumstances and involves both subjective and 
objective aspects. 
Although the accuseds had a subjective expectation 
of privacy respecting  the information the  police 
intended to obtain - whether marihuana was being 
sold in the store - their subjective intention to 
exclude all police officers was not objectively 
reasonable. The retail premises was open to the 
public and the expectation of privacy in a  publicly 
accessible store during  business hours was lower 
than in a  dwelling  place. Further, the tort of trespass 
or a proprietary interest in the property did not 
necessarily establish a  reasonable  expectation of 
privacy. These were merely factors that might be 
relevant in considering  the  circumstances as a 
whole.
As well, the information the police wanted to obtain 
was accessible to any member of the public who 
sought it out. Finally, the accuseds freely and readily 
engaged in conversation about drug  transactions on 
five different days when the undercover officers 
attended the store and purchased drugs. During  this 
time the police made various observations about the 
store, the accuseds and other patrons. The police 
were not intrusive and did not seek nor obtain any 
information that was not already available to the 
public. “The question of the reasonableness of the 
expectation of privacy also incorporates a balancing 
of societal interests in privacy with the legitimate 
interests of law enforcement,” said Justice Garson. 
“In my view, in balancing  those societal interests, an 
objectively reasonable  expectation of privacy in a 
retail store could not be achieved simply by posting 
a sign excluding  law enforcement officers.” She 
continued:
This would give too much weight to the 
subjective aspect of the s. 8  analysis. Privacy for 
the purposes of s.  8  must be assessed on an 
objective basis: would an objective observer 
construe the activities as being carried out in a 
private manner?   In this case, and considering 
that s. 8  “protects people not places”, the 
overwhelming evidence is that the activity of 
selling  drugs was done in a public setting. There 
is an element of artifice in the [accuseds’] claim 
to privacy in a place in which they were publicly 
and brazenly selling  marihuana, conduct that is 
currently unlawful. [para. 50]
The accuseds did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in conducting  business at the store, 
regardless of whether or not police  officers had been 
excluded from the premises. Since there was no 
reasonable privacy interest, there was no need to 
consider whether any search or seizure was 
reasonable. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
accuseds’ acquittals were set aside and a new trial 
was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“[T]he reasonableness of the expectation of privacy also incorporates a balancing of 
societal interests in privacy with the legitimate interests of law enforcement. ...[I]n balancing 
those societal interests, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a retail store 
could not be achieved simply by posting a sign excluding law enforcement officers.”
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COMMISSIONER	 MAY	 SWEAR	 
ITO,	 JP	 TO	 ISSUE	 WARRANT
R. v. D.G., 2014 ONCA 75
A police detective conducting  an 
internet invest igat ion formed 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
an IP  address was involved with 
accessing, sharing  and possessing 
child pornography. He located the physical address 
associated to the IP  address and prepared an 
Information to Obtain (ITO)  a s. 487 Criminal Code 
search warrant. Following  procedures established in 
his jurisdiction (Kitchener, Ontario), he  swore the 
ITO before  a commissioner for taking  oaths who was 
also employed by the detective’s police service. The 
warrant materials were then taken to the  courthouse, 
left with a court clerk and a Justice of the Peace (JP) 
subsequently signed the warrant based on the 
materials sworn before the commissioner. A search 
warrant was signed, executed and the accused was 
subsequently charged.
Ontario Court of Justice
Th accused suggested that the search 
warrant application did not comply with 
the Criminal Code  search warrant 
requirements and was therefore not a 
valid search warrant. The resulting  search was 
therefore unreasonable  under s. 8  of the Charter. In 
his view, s. 487 requires the ITO be sworn before the 
issuing  JP or, at the very least, before  any other JP. 
But the judge disagreed, concluding  that an ITO may 
be sworn before a commissioner of oaths. She 
opined that the wording  of s. 487(1) does not require 
the oath be taken before a JP, the  issuing  one or any 
other one. It authorizes “a justice” to issue a search 
warrant on the basis of “information on oath in Form 
1.” Nor was the fact the commissioner taking  the 
oath also worked for the police of concern. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  child 
pornography.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, again 
arguing  that swearing  of the ITO 
before a commissioner of oaths 
violated s. 487, resulted in an 
unlawful search and therefore  breached s. 8. The 
Court of Appeal, however, rejected this submission. 
There was nothing  in the language of s. 487(1)  nor 
the Form 1 to support the accused’s position:
There is nothing in the wording of s. 487(1) of 
the Code requiring that the information on oath 
must be sworn by a justice. Rather s. 487(1) 
provides that a justice must issue the warrant.
The role of a justice commissioning an oath 
comes into play only by virtue of the wording of 
Form 1.  Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, provides that “[w]here a 
form is prescribed, deviations from that form, not 
affecting  the substance or calculated to mislead, 
do not invalidate the form used.”  Section 849 of 
the Criminal Code permits forms in the Criminal 
Code to be “varied to suit the case”. That is what 
has happened in this case.  Form 1 has been 
amended in the Kitchener area (as it has been 
amended in other regions in Ontario and 
elsewhere in Canada) to permit commissioners 
of oaths to commission ITOs.  This is entirely 
appropriate and does not alter the essential point 
of s. 487(1), namely, that a justice must consider 
and issue the search warrant based on sworn 
evidence. [paras. 8-9]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Editor’s note:  Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
D. G., [2012] O.J. No. 2512 (ONCJ). 
CORROBORATION	 MAY	 ASSIST	 
WITH	 CREDIBILITY	 ASSESSMENT
 In 2010 the accused was 
charged with sex offences 
committed between 1973 
and 1978 when he was 
between the ages of 12 and 
17-years -o ld . He was 
required to respond to these 
allegations some 35 to 40 years 
after they occurred. At trial in a New Brunswick 
Provincial Court only the police investigator and the 
complainant (a brother of the accused)  testified for 
the Crown. The accused also took the stand along 
with three other witnesses; his wife, an uncle, and 
another brother. He categorically denied all the 
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allegations but was nonetheless convicted in 2012 of 
indecent assault and gross indecency. The accused 
then appealed his conviction (R. v. D.M.S., 2014 
NBCA 3). 
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal was quite 
critical of the police for not corroborating  the 
complainant’s statement. In its view, corroboration 
would have  been useful in establishing  a chronology 
of the events or assessing  credibility, as noted by the 
following examples:
➡ The complainant said he reported the abuse to 
his grandmother who in turn “tried to have 
Social Services come in and take the kids away 
from my parents.” The police did not make any 
effort to determine whether Social Services had 
a record of the grandmother’s report. 
➡ The complainant had said he was unsure of 
where  he was living  when he reported the 
abuse to his grandmother but did say he was in 
the hospital for the removal of his appendix. 
The police did not check with any area 
hospital’s to confirm whether he had been a 
patient. 
➡ The complainant testified on one occasion that 
the accused cut him across the ankle when he 
threatened to tell his parents about the abuse. 
This injury required the complainant to go to 
the hospital. The police did not check with any 
hospitals for a related record. 
➡ The complainant said his sister took him from 
the home but he  was returned after his parents 
put up  a  “big  stink.” The police  did not 
interview the sister nor was she called as a 
witness.
➡ The complainant named four other people he 
said were with him when he was 10-years-old 
and forced to have sex with a girl. The police 
did not interview these other people. 
When questioned about these shortcomings the 
investigator said she had no reason to disbelieve the 
complainant and that the other family members did 
not want to speak to police. As for his observations 
regarding the police investigation, Justice Bell wrote:
In many historic sexual assault cases, the police 
and prosecutorial authorities are faced with a 
paucity of potential evidence. Often, the only 
potential sources of information are the 
complainant and the alleged perpetrator. Such 
cases are often precariously prosecuted as a 
“credibility contest” between the alleged victim 
and the accused. That did not have to be the 
case in this matter. The determination of the 
issue of credibility, particularly with respect to 
the [accused] and his brother, the complainant, 
could have been greatly facilitated by minimal 
investigative efforts. [para. 5]
And further:
... I am surprised police would not fully 
investigate a matter because they heard 
indirectly that someone did not want to talk to 
them. One would expect the police to make 
reasonable efforts to speak directly with 
potential witnesses to determine whether they 
might exonerate the suspect or support the 
complainant’s version. It is painfully evident the 
police and prosecution proceeded in a “tunnel 
vision” fashion without any serious effort to 
investigate independent sources which could 
have confirmed or refuted the complainant’s 
version or aided in objectively assessing  his 
credibility.
 
I would add that New Brunswick is a jurisdiction 
where prosecutorial authorities review files and 
approve charges that are to be laid by police. 
The Attorney General’s office could, at any time, 
have requested the police conduct further 
enquiries of hospitals, social service departments 
or other potential witnesses, prior to approving 
charges. [paras. 7-8]
There were many problems with this case and a new 
trial was ordered after the  Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge misapprehended the evidence and made 
fundamental flaws in his reasoning. 
“It is painfully evident the police and 
prosecution proceeded in a “tunnel vision” 
fashion without any serious effort to 
investigate independent sources ...”
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B&E	 PRESUMPTION	 LOGICAL:	 
APPLIES	 UNLESS	 EVIDENCE	 TO	 
THE	 CONTRARY
R. v. Holland, 2013 NBCA 69
 
The occupants of a  home awoke to 
f i n d t h e a c c u s e d i n t h e i r 
house.  When they confronted him, 
he wanted the police called. When 
the police arrived and arrested him, 
he said he was with the FBI and he 
was there to save the occupants. He also talked 
about people from Afghanistan coming.
 
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The accused testified that he had been 
drinking  heavily that night. He thought he 
might be a  hero and thwart a crime when 
he followed another 
individual who had stated he 
would break into a home. At some 
point, this other person turned on 
the accused in a  threatening  way 
and then, armed with a piece of 
wood i n wh ich na i l s we re 
embedded, chased him. This 
caused the accused to seek refuge 
by breaking  into a home.  He 
argued that the evidence about his 
level of intoxication rebutted the 
presumption found in s. 348(2) of 
the Criminal Code  and negated the 
specific intent required that he had 
broken into the house with the 
intent to commit an indictable 
offence therein. One of three testifying  officers 
opined that the accused was intoxicated while  two 
other officers, as well as an occupant of the home, 
noted no obvious signs of intoxication. 
The judge did not believe the accused and 
concluded that he had entered the house with the 
intent to commit an indictable offence. Then, when 
the homeowner caught him, he spun a  tale  to try to 
extricate himself from the situation. He was 
convicted of break and enter with intent to commit 
an indictable offence under s. 348(1)(a)  of the 
Criminal Code. 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, that 
the trial judge erred in failing  to 
consider his evidence to the 
contrary which was sufficient to 
rebut the presumption. Justice Richards, speaking  for 
the Court of Appeal, described the presumption this 
way:
The presumption set out in s. 348(2) reflects the 
legal and logical relationship between the 
proven fact of [the accused] having  broken and 
entered the victim’s home and the inference that, 
as he had no right to be there, he must have 
done so with the intent to commit an offence. In 
the usual course of things, people have no 
business breaking  and entering into a stranger’s 
home, and it is logical to presume that, where 
one has done so, it is for an improper purpose. 
Of course, in some cases, there 
may be an innocent explanation. 
Thus, the legal effect of the 
presumption is that it is applied 
unless there is evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
In a criminal case, the onus of 
proof is on the prosecution to 
prove all elements of an offence 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where, as in s. 348(2), a provision 
creates a presumption that applies 
“in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary”, it is wrong to say that 
there is an onus on the accused to 
rebut the presumption on a 
balance of probabilities. The 
presumption applies unless there is any 
evidence, not expressly disbelieved, that would 
negate it. All the accused has to do is point to 
evidence to the contrary that could reasonably 
be true. Unless that evidence is affirmatively 
rejected, it will negate the effect of the 
presumption and then require the prosecution to 
prove the mens rea element of the office beyond 
a reasonable doubt. [paras. 11-12]:  
In this case, the accused offered two aspects of 
evidence to the contrary; (1) he broke into the house 
to escape the pursuit of a person who meant him 
harm and (2) he was intoxicated.
“The presumption set out in 
s. 348(2) reflects the legal 
and logical relationship 
between the proven fact of 
[the accused] having 
broken and entered the 
victim’s home and the 
inference that, as he had no 
right to be there, he must 
have done so with the intent 
to commit an offence.”
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As for breaking  into the home as a means of escape, 
the trial judge rejected this because the accused did 
not cry for help whether outside the home or upon 
entry. He only mentioned it when he was caught by 
the homeowner. The trial judge said he made up this 
story to get himself out of the situation. 
As for being  intoxicated, the accused was required 
to point to evidence that showed he was in a state of 
advanced intoxication to the degree of not being 
able to form the specific intent required for 
conviction; that he lacked the foresight of the 
consequences of his act. It is not enough to simply 
say he had been drinking. “To simply say there is 
evidence I was drinking  and therefore I could not 
have formed the intent to commit an indictable 
offence in the house into which I broke and entered 
is insufficient,” said Justice Richards. “The state  of an 
accused’s intoxication must be examined in light of 
all the circumstances. If these  suggest an advanced 
state of intoxication sufficient to raise  a reasonable 
doubt that the accused lacked the foresight of the 
consequences of his or her act, then intoxication 
may constitute evidence to the contrary.”
In this case, the trial judge expressly rejected the 
suggestion of advanced intoxication and therefore it 
could not have constituted evidence to the contrary. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
EVEN	 IF	 CHARTER	 BREACHED	 
EVIDENCE	 WAS	 ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Galbiati, 2014 BCCA 5
The police searched the accused’s 
property under the authority of a 
valid warrant. The search warrant was 
directed solely for evidence of a 
marihuana grow-operation in the 
“residence and garage”, notes and records relating 
to growing  marihuana, and documentation relating 
to “occupancy”.  The police found a pair of 
concealed rooms that had previously housed a grow 
operation and about 19 lbs. of marihuana packaged 
for sale.  Police also seized 28  firearms and 
ammunition that was unsafely stored throughout the 
house and readily visible. A backhoe and excavator 
on the property were also seized after police queried 
their VIN numbers and discovered they  were stolen. 
Police perused copies of the accused’s income tax 
returns found in the  house and formed the opinion 
that the “obvious high quality” of his home and 
assets indicated an income well in excess of that 
reported in the  tax  returns. A “proceeds of crime 
investigation” commenced and various other 
vehicles and property belonging  to the accused were 
seized on the basis that these  items were evidence 
“in plain view” relating  to this proceeds of crime 
investigation. No new search warrant was obtained 
to seize these items.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused was only charged with 
possessing  marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking  and unsafely storing  firearms. 
He was never charged with any offence 
related to the seized vehicles nor with being  in 
possession of proceeds of crime. He argued that all 
of the  evidence seized, including  the marihuana, 
guns and ammunition, should be excluded under 
s. 24(2)  of the Charter. He contended that the police 
had gone far beyond the terms of the search warrant 
in seizing  the  two stolen vehicles, in reading  his 
income tax returns and in seizing  the other vehicles 
on the basis of a proceeds of crime investigation. In 
his submission, the search warrant had not been 
properly or reasonably executed and all of the 
evidence was in effect tainted.
The judge concluded that there were four distinct 
investigations: (1)  the marihuana grow operation (for 
which the warrant was granted), (2)  proceeds of 
crime, (3)  firearms and (4)  stolen equipment. She 
concluded that the marihuana was obtained by 
virtue of a lawful search warrant and the guns and 
ammunition were lawfully seized under the plain 
view doctrine. However, she found the police 
should have obtained another search warrant to 
seize  the  stolen vehicles and also when they became 
suspicious and made seizures in pursuit of the 
proceeds of crime investigation. The proceeds of 
crime property therefore  had been improperly seized 
and breached s. 8  of the Charter. She would have 
excluded this evidence had a proceeds of crime 
charge been laid. However, she admitted the 
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evidence on the marihuana grow operation and 
firearms storage charges. There were no breaches 
related to this evidence and excluding  it would have 
brought the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The accused was convicted of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and unsafely storing firearms. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that his rights 
under s. 8  of the  Charter were 
breached and that all of the 
evidence ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed. It was doubtful that the 
evidence of the  marihuana and guns was obtained 
in a manner that infringed s. 8 even though the trial 
judge found breaches regarding  the stolen 
equipment and proceeds of crime seizures. And, 
even assuming  the marihuana items, firearms and 
ammunition were found and seized as part of one 
overall transaction which breached s. 8, the 
admission of this evidence would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The seized 
property was in plain view and police acted in good 
faith. “There was no suggestion [police] conduct was 
part of an overall pattern of ‘short-cuts’ or failures to 
respect the  constitutional rights of persons 
encountered by the police in the course of their 
e x e r c i s e o f t h e i r d u t i e s ,” s a i d J u s t i c e 
Newbury.  “Society  has an interest in having  the 
charges adjudicated, and even if the firearms 
charges were  ‘regulatory’ and at the less serious end 
of the spectrum as counsel suggests, the 
consequences of [the accused’s] failing  to store the 
guns and ammunition properly could be serious 
indeed.“ Deference was owed to the findings of the 
trial judge and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“[P]olice practice is one thing. What the law is on 
the mater is quite another. Unless authorised by 
judicial decision or by statute, police practice is no 
more than that. It is not the law.” - Lord Hope of 
Craighead, R. v. Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, [2002] 2 All ER 865 at para. 18.
IMPORTING	 REQUIRES	 MORE	 
THAN	 KNOWLEDGE	 &	 RECEIPT	 
OF	 CONTRABAND
R. v Atuh, 2013 ABCA 350
Two packages from Pakistan that 
were addressed to third persons at 
the accused ’s addres s were 
intercepted by police when the 
goods arrived in Canada. The 
packages contained books with heroin in their 
spines. The police rigged the books with an alarm. A 
police officer dressed as a Canada Post carrier then 
delivered the goods to the address on the packages. 
The accused told the police officer that he was 
expecting  packages, that the addressees lived at the 
address and that he  could accept the packages for 
them. About one and one half hours after delivery 
the alarm went off when the accused opened a book 
from one of the packages. The police entered the 
home and arrested the accused for both possession 
for the purpose of trafficking and importation.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge concluded that the accused 
knew that there were drugs in the 
package. As a result, he was convicted of 
possessing  heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking  and importing. The basis for the importing 
conviction was the accused telling  the police he was 
expecting  packages, that the addressees lived at the 
residence and that he could accept delivery on their 
behalf.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused appealed only his 
importation conviction. He argued 
that importing  could not be proven 
simply by establishing  that a 
person knowingly accepted imported drugs in a 
controlled delivery. Furthermore, he suggested that 
merely expecting  and accepting  packages knowing 
they contained drugs did not make him a party to 
the offence of importing. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted that importation was a  continuing 
offence that did not end until the product reached its 
final destination.  
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The Court of Appeal, even assuming  that 
importation was a continuing  offence, found a 
conviction in this case was not warranted. “To prove 
that a recipient is guilty  of importing, something 
more than receipt and knowledge of receiving  a 
controlled drug  is required to prove that the 
recipient was either a principal in, or party to, 
importing,” said the Appeal Court. “Here the trial 
judge did not turn his mind to whether [the  accused] 
knew where the drugs were coming  from.” The trial 
judge was not only to consider the accused’s 
knowledge that the books contained drugs but also 
the origin of the drugs. The Crown was required to 
prove that the  accused knew that the drugs he 
knowingly expected and accepted were from out of 
the country. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
for importation was vacated and a new trial on that 
charge was ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NO	 s.	 10(b)	 CHARTER	 BREACH:	 
ARRESTEE	 SATISFIED	 WITH	 
DUTY	 COUNSEL
R. v. McLeod, 2013 SKCA 28                   
A police officer arrested the accused 
for impaired driving, made a demand 
for breath samples, advised him of his 
right to retain and instruct counsel of 
choice without delay, and informed 
him that Legal Aid duty counsel was available free 
of charge. The accused confirmed he understood. At 
the police station, the  arresting  officer asked 
whether the  accused wished to contact a lawyer. He 
responded that he wanted to talk to a lawyer but he 
did not have one. The officer told him that he could 
call a lawyer, or family or friends to help find a 
lawyer, and that legal aid duty counsel was available 
at no cost. This conversation took place at the police 
station in an interview room in which there was no 
telephone, no phone book and no list of lawyers. 
The accused indicated that he wanted to contact 
Legal Aid. The officer arranged a call to Legal Aid 
and the accused spoke with duty counsel for about 
seven minutes. He was escorted to the interview 
room, asked if he  was satisfied with his call and 
replied that he was. He was then taken to the 
Intoxilyzer technician and again confirmed he was 
satisfied with his Legal Aid  consultation. He then 
took the Intoxilyzer tests and failed. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the accused’s right to 
counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter had 
been breached because the police never 
mentioned that a phone book was 
available and never presented one to him. Because 
of this, the accused’s implementational component 
of his right to counsel could not be carried out. In 
the judge’s view, the accused’s only  option was to 
call Legal Aid; thus there was no real choice. The 
certificate of analyses was excluded and the accused 
was acquitted of driving over 80mg%.
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown’s appeal was successful. An 
appeal judge concluded that there was no 
s. 10(b)  breach. Because the accused 
expressed sa t i s fac t ion about h i s 
consultation with counsel, the police were entitled 
to assume that his right to counsel had been satisfied 
and they could proceed with taking  the breath 
samples. And, even if there had been some error in 
the police facilitating  the right to counsel, that error 
had been superseded by the accused’s expression of 
satisfaction. His acquittal was set aside and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
A further appeal by the accused 
was dismissed. The Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal concluded that 
the accused’s s. 10(b) rights had 
not been breached as found by the Court of Queen’s 
Bench. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note:  The accused then sought leave to 
appeal to the  Supreme Court of Canada. The 
application, however, was dismissed. R. v. McLeod, 
[2013] S.C.C.A. No. 224.
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CO-OFFENDING	 ASSAULTS	 
AGAINST	 POLICE	 OFFICERS
According  to a Statistics Canada 
report recently released entitled 
“Co-offending  in Canada, 
2011” there were 8,145 
incidents in Canada of 
assaulting  a  police officer. Of 
those, 7,374 involved a lone 
offender, 616  were committed 
by pairs, and 155 were a 
group crime, involving  three 
or more accused. 
In Canada, co-offending  - crimes involving  two or 
more accused - accounted for 11% of cleared 
incidents. Most co-offences were pair crimes (76%) 
while the remaining  24% involved three or more 
people. Co-offending  was more common among 
female accused (27%) than male  accused (21%). For 
co-offending  groups, however, most were made 
exclusively of males (54%). 
Co-offending  was also more common among  youth 
(12-17 years old)  at 44% while adults co-offended 
only 19%. 
Co-offending  was more common in the following 
offences:
• Drug  trafficking, production, importation/
exportation = 34%
• Robbery = 32%
• Arson = 30%
• Counterfeiting = 24%
Co-offending  was less common in the following 
offences: 
• Impaired driving - 1%
• Sexual violations against children - 2%
• Administration of justice - 3%
• Level 1 sexual assaults - 3%
Co-offences were more likely  to involve a  firearm or 
other weapon, or result in injury to the victim 
compared to lone offences. 
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MANNER	 OF	 DETENTION	 WAS	 
‘OVER-KILL’	 IN	 THE	 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Christie, 2013 NBCA 64
Shortly after midnight a patrol officer 
in a marked police cruiser stopped 
the accused after he saw him driving 
with an expired registration sticker on 
his vehicle. The officer requested his 
driver’s license, registration and proof of insurance. 
The accused was unable to produce a driver’s 
license and had no current proof of insurance or 
registration. The officer saw an open bottle of wine 
on the floor behind the driver’s seat as well as a 
large buck hunting  knife  in the driver’s door pocket. 
The officer, after calling  for back-up  but before it 
arrived, asked the accused to step  out of the vehicle, 
handcuffed him behind his back  and placed him in 
the rear seat of his police cruiser. He wanted to 
search the vehicle for more liquor and other 
weapons. He searched a duffle bag  on the front 
passenger seat and located various quantities of 
cocaine including  a 28 gram rock, as well as 
marihuana, baggies and weigh scales. He also found 
two cellular telephones in the center console and an 
additional quantity  of marihuana under the driver’s 
seat. The officer returned to his police car, identified 
the accused and arrested him for the drug  offences. 
He was subsequently transported to the police 
station where he was searched again and a  small 
additional amount of cocaine was located on his 
person. He was charged with drug offences.
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The accused accepted that his original 
detention was lawful when his vehicle 
was pulled over to investigate the motor 
vehicle infraction - an expired licence 
plate. But the nature of his detention changed when 
he was asked to step out of the vehicle, handcuffed 
with his hands behind his back and confined in the 
rear seat of the police vehicle. The judge, however, 
concluded that this action - the handcuffed 
detention - was reasonably  necessary in the 
circumstances to address the risk when the officer 
saw the knife in the pocket of the driver’s door. As 
for the search of the vehicle  and the duffle bag, the 
judge conducted a step-by-step  analysis of how the 
matter evolved from a Motor Vehicle  Act (MVA)  stop 
into a search. In this case, he found the officer 
conducted the search for his own safety  as well as to 
locate other evidence. The search was valid and 
there  were no Charter violations. The accused was 
convicted of simple possession of marihuana and 
possessing  cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. He 
was sentenced to 17 months in prison. 
 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions arguing  that his 
detention became unlawful and 
the warrantless searches were 
unreasonable. Thus, he contended his ss. 8 
(unreasonable search and seizure)  and 9 (arbitrary 
detention)  Charter rights were breached and the 
evidence was inadmissible under s. 24(2).
 
The Detention          
 
Once again the accused did not challenge the 
lawfulness of his original detention when he was 
pulled over and investigated for the MVA offence. 
However, the drastic change in the nature of his 
detention was unjustified. Justice Deschênes, 
delivering  the Court of Appeal’s judgment, disagreed 
with the trial judge that the manner of detention - 
securing  the accused in the police  cruiser in 
handcuffs - was reasonably necessary in the totality 
of the circumstances. The trial judge failed to 
determine “whether there were other reasonable 
means available to the officer to alleviate his safety 
concerns about the presence of the knife, short of 
what he did.”
In this case, there were several relevant 
circumstances that the trial judge failed to mention:
• The accused readily  identified himself in 
response to a  request from the officer and 
produced an expired vehicle registration card 
bearing his name.
• He was being  investigated for summary 
offences under New Brunswick’s MVA and 
Liquor Control Act (LCA). 
•  The hunting  knife was properly in its case and 
stored in a  space  designated for storage in the 
driver’s door.
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• There was nothing  in the  accused's conduct 
which would raise any safety concerns for the 
officer, nor did the officer have any reason to 
suspect that the accused might be  a danger to 
anyone.
• The accused was not asked to hand over the 
knife or the car keys before he was instructed to 
step out of the vehicle to be handcuffed and 
placed in the police cruiser.
• The officer had made contact with another unit 
on patrol very early on after the accused’s 
vehicle was pulled over and he knew help 
would arrive within a few minutes. Although 
the circumstances recited by  the trial judge 
could lead one to conclude that the call for a 
second unit took place after the accused had 
been secured in the police cruiser, the evidence 
is that the call was made before the accused 
was placed in the police vehicle.
• As soon as the officer realized the accused was 
unable to produce any  relevant documents 
pursuant to the MVA, there was no question in 
his mind that the accused’s vehicle was going 
to be impounded.
• The quick pat-down search of the accused as 
he stepped out of his vehicle did not raise any 
safety concerns.
Justice Deschênes stated:
Under such circumstances, obvious questions 
come to mind. Why, for example, was it 
important to rush into this detention when, to 
the officer’s knowledge, a second unit was a few 
minutes away? A short wait with the [accused] 
being detained in his own vehicle under the 
officer’s watchful eye until arrival of a second 
unit would not have impinged on the [accused’s] 
right to be released from detention as soon as 
reasonably possible. Nor would a wait of a few 
minutes necessarily put the safety of the officer 
in jeopardy. What prevented the officer from 
asking the [accused] to hand over the keys to the 
vehicle?  After all, the [accused] could not 
produce the required documents and would 
certainly not be allowed to drive away. Would it 
be unreasonably unsafe to ask the [accused] to 
carefully hand over the sheathed hunting  knife? 
Finally, is it unrealistic to think that the arrival of 
other officers on the scene would have 
eliminated the necessity of the detention in the 
police vehicle and would not have jeopardized 
the investigation being  carried on for infractions 
under the relevant provincial statutes?
 
In my respectful view, the obvious answers to 
these questions reveal that the officer could have 
addressed his safety concerns in a way that 
would have fallen well short of the drastic 
detention imposed upon the [accused]. [paras. 
19-20]
Detaining  the accused in handcuffs in the rear of the 
police vehicle was not reasonably necessary. It was 
unlawful and therefore arbitrary, breaching  s. 9 of 
the Charter. 
 
The Search
 
Since the accused had a  privacy interest in his 
vehicle and the duffle bag, the warrantless search 
would only be reasonable if it was authorized by 
law, if the law itself was reasonable and if the search 
was carried out in a reasonable manner. The accused 
argued that the trial judge equated the common law 
search authority under investigative detention 
(limited to searches for personal safety only) to the 
search authority pursuant to an arrest (which 
includes the additional power to search for 
evidence). The Crown submitted that the statutory 
search and seizure provisions found in New 
Brunswick’s Provincial Offences Procedure Act 
(POPA) permitted the searches. 
 
Common Law - Investigative Detention
 
When the police lawfully detain a person for 
investigation they may engage in a protective pat-
down search of the detainee if they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that their safety or that of others 
is at risk. This search power, which is narrowly 
focussed and limited to safety concerns, is to be 
distinguished from the broader power to search 
incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to 
arrest has three main purposes: 
1. to ensure the safety of the police and the 
public; 
2. the protection of evidence from destruction; 
and 
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3. the discovery of evidence that can be used 
against the accused. 
Searches incident to a lawful detention, on the other 
hand, are limited to legitimate safety concerns and 
do not permit searches for evidence connected to 
the reasons for the detention. In this case, the officer 
did not have the power to search the vehicle or the 
duffle  bag  at common law incidental to the 
detention for evidence related to infractions under 
the LCA.
 
As for the  officer’s other professed reason to search 
the duffle bag, for weapons in order to alleviate his 
safety concerns, the Court of Appeal found this 
difficult to understand. “After all, the officer had no 
information relating  to the [accused] that would 
cause him to have safety concerns,” said Justice 
Deschênes. “The knife was properly confined in a 
legitimate location and a second police  vehicle was 
a few minutes away. Of more significance is the fact 
that when the officer decided to open the duffle bag 
to look for evidence of open liquor or other 
weapons, the [accused] was sitting, handcuffed, in 
the police cruiser and his vehicle was going  to be 
impounded. Under such circumstances, it offends 
common sense to say that the officer had a 
legitimate concern for his or the public’s safety.”
 
The common law power to search incident to an 
investigative detention did not allow the officer to 
search the duffle bag, seize its contents nor search 
under the driver’s seat.
Statute Law
The Court of Appeal also found the search of the 
duffle bag  could not be justified pursuant to a 
statutory power. A search under s. 135 of POPA 
requires that the searching  officer have reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe that there was, in or 
upon the vehicle or container, an item of evidence 
and that it was impracticable in the circumstances to 
obtain a search warrant. These two requirements 
(reasonable belief and impracticability)  must be 
proven to trigger the right to search for further 
evidence of regulatory offences under a provincial 
statute. Although the Crown argued that the officer 
had the requisite grounds to believe evidence of 
other open liquor bottles would be found in the 
duffle bag  on the basis of an open bottle of wine 
behind the driver’s seat, the officer’s own testimony 
did not support this position. The evidence did not 
establish that the officer believed, on reasonable and 
probable grounds, that evidence of an offence under 
the LCA would be found in the vehicle or a 
container. Instead, the  officer said he had a  right to 
search the vehicle without a warrant because the 
search could “possibly” lead him to other open 
bottles of liquor or other weapons. In addition, the 
Crown did not establish that it would have been 
impracticable to apply for a  warrant. Since  the 
Crown did not satisfy the onus of establishing  the 
requirements of s. 135, the search and seizure of the 
cocaine and drug  trafficking  accessories in the duffle 
bag, including  the marijuana found in the  vehicle, 
were unlawful and breached s. 8. The arrest that 
followed was also unlawful, as was the seizure of 
evidence resulting  from the search incident to such 
arrest.
s. 24(2) Charter
           
In determining  whether the evidence should be 
excluded, the Court of Appeal found the the Charter-
infringing  conduct was serious. “The officer knew or 
ought to have known that he had options other than 
the type of detention he decided to impose,” said 
Justice Deschênes. “The detention of [the accused] 
in the back of the police vehicle in handcuffs was 
uncalled for under the circumstances and was a 
serious infringement of [his] s. 9 Charter right not to 
be detained arbitrarily.” He continued:
BY THE BOOK:
New	 Brunswick’s	 Provincial	 Offences	 
Procedure	 Act
s. 135 (1) A peace officer may search, 
without warrant, any vehicle or container 
i f the peace off icer believes, on 
reasonable and probable grounds, that 
there is in or upon the vehicle or 
container an item of evidence and that it is 
impracticable in the circumstances to obtain a search 
warrant. ... ... ...
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But what is perhaps more serious is the unlawful 
search of the vehicle, more particularly the 
duffle bag under the purported authority of the 
Liquor Control Act,  or the pretense of a safety 
concern, a concern that simply defies common 
sense. Again, the officer knew or ought to have 
known of the requirements of reasonable and 
probable grounds needed to open the duffle bag 
and that some thought had to be given to 
obtaining  a search warrant. In my view, the 
officer acted with disregard for the [accused’s] 
rights not to be subjected to an unreasonable 
search and seizure under s. 8  of the Charter. The 
seriousness is aggravated when one considers 
the officer’s testimony that he believed he could 
open the duffle bag based upon only the 
“possibility” of finding “open liquor”. This is 
evidence of an abusive practice – one that must 
be soundly denounced. To admit the evidence 
would be to encourage situations where police 
officers could insist, when it is not reasonably 
necessary, on using  handcuffs to confine a 
person in the rear seat of police vehicles and to 
search persons or vehicles without the grounds 
required by law. This could have a chilling effect 
on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. 
[para. 56]
Despite the accused’s reduced privacy interest in the 
search of his vehicle, the impact of the breach on 
the accused’s Charter-protected interests was 
significant, which also favoured exclusion:
The detention in the police vehicle in handcuffs 
was arbitrary and impacted upon the [accused’s] 
liberty interests to a considerable extent. The 
search of his vehicle, and particularly the duffle 
bag, without the required reasonable grounds 
impacts upon the [accused’s] privacy interest. 
The search of the duffle bag expanded way 
beyond the scope of one allowed to alleviate 
safety concerns.
 
Finally, although the evidence was both relevant and 
reliable, and the  truth seeking  function of the 
criminal trial process favoured admission of the 
evidence, the evidence was nonetheless excluded:
The main reason relates to the seriousness of the 
conduct of the officer in clear violation of the 
[accused’s] ss. 8  and 9 rights. He employed a 
type of detention that was clearly “over-kill” in 
the circumstances when he had many other 
options at his disposal. He also conducted a 
search of the duffle bag  when there were neither 
reasonable grounds to allow it in the context of 
an infraction under the Liquor Control Act, nor 
any genuine safety concerns. The search also 
appeared to be part of a standard practice 
followed by the officer, a practice based upon 
the possibility of finding  evidence of an 
infraction without consideration of the 
requirements of reasonable grounds or the 
practicality of trying  to obtain a warrant. In my 
view, the Court must dissociate itself from this 
conduct. [para. 59]
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the  evidence 
excluded and acquittals entered.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SNIFFER-DOG	 DEPLOYMENT	 
LAWFUL:	 REASONABLE	 
SUSPICION	 STANDARD	 MET
R. v. Navales, 2014 ABCA 70
   
The accused arrived in Calgary on an 
overnight bus from Vancouver and 
was observed by a plain-clothes 
police officer disembark and enter 
the bus depot. The officer was 
patrolling  the bus depot as part of an “Operation 
Jetway” program, which targets drug  trafficking  and 
regularly monitored this particular bus route because 
Vancouver was known as a major hub  for the supply 
of drugs. The accused walked towards the exit, then 
changed direction to the washroom area where 
police dogs were training. The accused noticed the 
police dogs, stopped, and changed direction towards 
the exit again. He then turned around again and 
headed back the  way he had come until a police 
“[T]he officer knew or ought to have known of the requirements of reasonable and 
probable grounds needed to open the duffle bag and that some thought had to be given to 
obtaining a search warrant.”
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dog  crossed his path. He then stopped, turned and, 
once more, headed back to the exit. The officer 
followed the  accused outside the bus depot and 
spoke to him, hoping  he would agree to a luggage 
search. The accused showed the officer his bus 
ticket, which was purchased 35 to 45 minutes before 
the bus departed. The ticket had been purchased 
with cash in a name different than the accused’s 
identification, which he provided to the officer from 
his wallet. The officer also noted that the accused 
had a large quantity of $100 bills in his wallet. 
When asked how long  he was staying  in Calgary, the 
accused gave two different responses within a 
minute or two. His behaviour became increasing 
nervous and when asked, “Did you pack your 
bags?”, after a  3  to 4 second delay, the accused 
replied, “For the most part.” A police dog  was 
summoned to sniff the accused’s luggage. When the 
dog  indicated a drug  scent, the accused was arrested 
and his bag  was manually searched. Ten one 
kilogram bricks of cocaine were found inside.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that he was 
subjected to an unreasonable search 
under s. 8  of the Charter because the dog 
sniff was not based on a reasonable 
suspicion. The judge, however, disagreed. The judge 
noted that the reasonable suspicion standard 
required more than a sincerely held subjective belief 
on the  part of the police officer. It must be supported 
by factual elements that can be adduced into 
evidence and permit an independent judicial 
assessment. “Trial judges need to look at the totality 
of the circumstances and review all the  relevant 
factors collectively,” she said. In determining  that the 
search met the  reasonable suspicion standard for a 
dog  sniff, the judge identified the following  relevant 
factors, none of which individually would support a 
reasonable suspicion, but when taken together 
supported “an objective suspicion by a reasonable 
person that [the accused] was in possession of 
contraband”:
1. The bus was from Vancouver.
2. The accused said he was from Vancouver.
3. The accused’s changes of direction in the bus 
depot and his attention to the police dogs.
4. The accused’s bus ticket was purchased last 
minute and he paid cash.
5. The accused used what appeared to be a  false 
name when he purchased his ticket.
6. The accused’s wallet contained $100 bills, a 
denomination of bill the  officer testified is used 
in the drug business.
7. The accused gave two different versions of how 
long  he planned to stay in Calgary within one 
or two minutes.
8. The accused’s increased nervousness.
9. The officer’s question, “Did you pack your bags 
yourself?” to which the appellant replied after a 
3 to 4 second delay, “for the most part.”
The officer also testified that he had 26  years of 
experience with the  drug  unit, including  8  years 
with the Jetway program, that the Jetway team found 
the Vancouver route very productive for drug 
seizures, and that he had been told by drug  couriers 
that they would purchase  bus tickets at the last 
minute. There was no s. 8  breach, the evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted of 
trafficking in cocaine.
Alberta Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
conviction, again asserting  his s. 8 
right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure was violated. The 
Court of Appeal noted that a dog  sniff of a traveller’s 
luggage in a public terminal is a search within the 
meaning  of s 8. However, the police have a  common 
law power to engage in a sniffer-dog  search as a tool 
to investigate drug  offences if they have a 
“reasonable suspicion” that the person is involved in 
drug  related offences. “The reasonable suspicion 
standard addresses the possibility of uncovering 
criminality, not the probability  of doing  so,” said 
Justice Paperny for the majority. “The assessment of 
the constellation of factors must be done in a 
flexible and common sense manner, through the 
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eyes of a reasonable person armed with the 
knowledge, training  and experience of the 
investigating officer.” She further stated:
Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against 
the totality of the circumstances; the inquiry 
must consider the constellation of objectively 
discernible facts said to give the investigating 
officer reasonable cause to suspect that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity. The 
suspicion must be sufficiently particularized, and 
not amount merely to a generalized suspicion 
that would include too many presumably 
innocent persons within its purview. For this 
reason, factors that apply broadly to innocent 
people and those that may “go both ways”, 
cannot, on their own, support a reasonable 
suspicion. However, exculpatory, neutral or 
equivocal information cannot be disregarded 
when assessing  the constellation of factors. The 
totality of the circumstances, including 
favourable and unfavourable factors, must be 
weighed in the course of arriving at any 
conclusion regarding reasonable suspicion. 
[references omitted, para. 19]
In this case, the trial judge properly examined the 
totality  of the circumstances, rather than assessing 
the factors individually. Some of the circumstances 
were general, such as the fact that the accused was 
traveling  from Vancouver and was himself from 
Vancouver, while others were particular to the 
accused, such as his ticket purchase under a false 
name, two different versions of his plans when 
questioned, his possession of several $100 bills, his 
increasing  nervousness, his actions to avoid the 
police dogs and his delayed response to the question 
as to whether he had packed his own bags. “The trial 
judge rightly  noted that no one circumstance on its 
own would support a finding  of reasonable 
suspicion, but she judged that, taken together, the 
evidence was capable of supporting  a logical 
inference that the [accused] was in possession of 
contraband,” said Justice Paperny. The trial judge  was 
also entitled to take the officer’s experience into 
account in assessing  those factors that might 
otherwise  be considered as too general to support a 
reasonable suspicion.
There was no reason to interfere with the trial judge’s 
analysis. The majority  dismissed the accused’s 
appeal. 
Same Result, Own Reasons
Justice Berger also would dismiss the 
appeal, but gave his own reasons. In his 
view, recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions have “dramatically  [lowered] 
the threshold for searches by police officers on the 
basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’.” This standard 
engages the mere “possibility” of crime, which he 
felt had been “transformed into nothing  more than a 
generalized suspicion.” Since the standard was now 
so markedly diminished, he opined that the outcome 
of the appeal was inevitable.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“Reasonable suspicion must be assessed against the totality of the circumstances; the 
inquiry must consider the constellation of objectively discernible facts said to give the 
investigating officer reasonable cause to suspect that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity. The suspicion must be sufficiently particularized, and not amount merely to a 
generalized suspicion that would include too many presumably innocent persons within its 
purview. For this reason, factors that apply broadly to innocent people and those that 
may “go both ways”, cannot, on their own, support a reasonable suspicion. However, 
exculpatory, neutral or equivocal information cannot be disregarded when assessing the 
constellation of factors. The totality of the circumstances, including favourable and 
unfavourable factors, must be weighed in the course of arriving at any conclusion 
regarding reasonable suspicion. 
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JACK E. ENTER 
 
Jack Enter has been associated with 
the field of criminal justice since 1972 
when he began his career as a law 
enforcement officer.  Since that time, 
he has worked as a street police 
officer, detective, vice/narcotics 
investigator, and as the administrator 
of a law enforcement agency in the 
suburbs of Atlanta.  Jack obtained his 
Ph.D. in 1984 and has served as a 
professor and administrator in the 
university setting and served as 
Director of Information and Education 
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Coordinating Council.  He was also 
one of the research associates 
assigned to the planning of the 
security component of the 1996 
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta. 
He has lectured throughout the United 
States and abroad.  He recently 
published his first book: Challenging 
the Law Enforcement Organization: 
Proactive Leadership Strategies. 
Jack lives in Auburn, Georgia, with his 
wife Barbara.  They have three adult 
children and five grandchildren. 
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The law enforcement profession is continuing to face significant 
challenges in its operational and organizational roles.  Unfortunately, 
one of the more pressing issues facing law enforcement agencies 
may be the failure of its supervisors and managers to consistently 
practice recognized leadership principles that they learn in 
management training programs. Most supervisors and managers 
VHHP WR WDNH WKH ³SDWK RI OHDVW UHVLVWDQFH´ ZKHQ GHDOLQJ ZLWK
problem employees or in communicating with employees.  This 
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managers and these leadership failures have become a significant 
form of stress and frustration for the law enforcement culture.  (
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This program examines why these problems occur, and the practical 
methods that managers and supervisors can use to become 
effective leaders and walk the narrow road of leadership excellence ± 
both at work and at home. 
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8:00 am to 12:00 pm 
Friday, 28 March 2014 
 
JIBC Theatre 
715 McBride Boulevard, 
New Westminster, BC V3L 5T4 
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